

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Bulletin



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Foreign Ministers Continue Discussions on Berlin and German Unification

Statements by Secretary Herter¹

STATEMENT OF JULY 20

As indicated in my statement of July 16,² I had hoped that we might concentrate on the specific elements of an interim agreed Berlin arrangement to last until German unification—deferring until later in our deliberations further discussion of procedures for attaining German unification. This had seemed a necessary course since Mr. Gromyko had adamantly refused to discuss the problem of German reunification when the Western Powers pressed for earlier consideration of this question by the conference. Because of this refusal, we had been unable to make progress in our discussions of the overall German question and had moved on to a review of the situation in Berlin.

The Soviet proposal for a committee of free and Communist Germans interrupted our discussion of measures which might be taken in Berlin. It thereby confused two separate issues with consequent delay in the work of this conference. Mr. Couve de Murville had already pointed this out at our meetings on July 15 and 16.

Mr. Gromyko, however, refuses to drop this new insistence that we now consider the Soviet proposal regarding procedures for future efforts to achieve German unification.

Since we agree that this is an important—although separate—question, I shall today set forth a new proposal of the Western Powers as to the procedures for promoting German unity which,

given the circumstances, holds the greatest promise. I hope to show that this proposal provides a sound basis for further consideration by the Foreign Ministers of this question, in which we have a great and continuing interest.

Soviet Proposal for Mixed Committee

To this end, I intend to take advantage of Mr. Gromyko's suggestion that we should, if we cannot accept his proposal for a mixed committee of free and Communist Germans, offer some alternative proposal for future discussions of German reunification. Before I do so, however, let me review briefly where we now stand in our consideration of this matter.

The Western peace plan which was first submitted to this conference more than 2 months ago³ is a phased plan for achieving German reunification. If accepted by the Soviets, it will most certainly lead to early reunification of Germany. This plan provides for a mixed German committee. This committee would operate within the framework of the most comprehensive program yet submitted to solve the problem of German reunification on the basis of free determination by the German people.

The mixed German committee in the Western peace plan would be established after the Four Powers had taken a final decision on early reunification and on the process whereby it could be achieved. Its major task would be to prepare a draft law providing free elections which would be submitted to a plebiscite in both parts of Germany. If the committee could not agree on such

¹ Made at the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of France, the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, and the United States at Geneva, Switzerland.

² For text, see BULLETIN of Aug. 3, 1959, p. 147.

³ For text, see *ibid.*, June 1, 1959, p. 779.

a law, its members from the Federal Republic and East Germany would prepare alternative draft laws, to be submitted to a plebiscite as alternatives. Acceptance by a majority of the population of both parts of Germany would be required for the approval of a specific electoral law. This provision was intended to assure maximum freedom of choice for the population of the so-called German Democratic Republic. On the basis of resulting free elections, an all-German assembly would be chosen to draft an all-German constitution. The all-German government formed on the basis of that constitution would be responsible for negotiating an all-German peace treaty.

Thus, in the Western peace plan, the mixed German committee would represent one step in a truly democratic process whose fulfillment would assure German unity in freedom and a peace settlement with a German government representing all of the German people.

What Mr. Gromyko has done is to pull this one feature of the Western peace plan out of its context, changing its composition and its task, and then relating it to the Berlin question in a way which distorts the correct approach to both the Berlin problem and the problem of Germany as a whole.

The mixed German committee was included in the Western peace plan as one of a number of important innovations which responded to Soviet criticisms of the proposal made by the Western Powers at Geneva in 1955. We have no doubt that a number of other provisions included in this effort to take account of Soviet views would also be attractive to the Soviet Government *if taken out of context*.

The Soviet Union is now suggesting that the Western Powers should agree to the isolated establishment of a German committee with a time limit to its deliberations. This would not be in return for Soviet agreement to a plan which would assure German unification. It would merely be in return for a statement that the Soviet Union, for a very limited period of time, would not violate its existing solemn commitments with respect to Berlin.

The U.S.S.R. proposal has, moreover, so altered the context of this part of the Western peace plan that its acceptance would now perpetuate the division of Germany, rather than assure its unification.

The Soviet proposal does not provide for an agreed process which would lead to reunification.

And it is perfectly clear to every one of us in this room that unity in freedom would not be the clearly accepted goal of all its members. For the authorities of the so-called German Democratic Republic have made evident time and time again that they are not prepared to work out plans which would permit reunification on any basis that would not result in the communization of the Federal Republic of Germany regardless of the will of the people. Mr. Gromyko has insisted that we cannot predict what his German committee would achieve. For my part, I can predict with confidence that, on the basis of available evidence and experience and under the conditions proposed by Mr. Gromyko, the committee would surely and quickly deadlock.

There is not the slightest hope that the committee would call for the selection of an all-German government on the basis of free elections. One-half of the committee would be composed of representatives of a regime which is aware that free elections conducted within its borders would inevitably lead to its disappearance. We can be equally sure, on the other hand, that the representatives of the Federal Republic would not sacrifice their freedom by accepting proposals whose clearly demonstrated purpose is to undermine that freedom.

For the reasons which I have just given, the all-German committee proposed by the Soviet Foreign Minister in his statement to the plenary session of this conference of June 10 and repeated by him in his proposal of June 19 is totally unacceptable.

Let me further point out that his proposal would constitute a substantial abandonment by the Four Powers of their common responsibility for the settlement of the German question and the reunification of Germany.

The basic responsibility for the solution of these matters, so gravely affecting not only Germany but all Europe and indeed all the world, must be placed where it belongs—on the representatives of France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States. This conforms to common sense and to the solemn written commitments which Prime Minister Bulganin concluded with President Eisenhower, Prime Minister Faure, and Prime Minister Eden, when the four Heads of Government reaffirmed their recognition of this common responsibility at the summit conference

in 1955.⁴ It is in the interest of each one of our countries that this responsibility should be fulfilled, so that we can be assured that Germany will be reunified on terms which strengthen the peace of the world.

The intention of the Soviet proposal, furthermore, is to obtain an unwarranted measure of respectability for the regime which has been imposed upon the people of East Germany. I am speaking of the so-called German Democratic Republic. That regime has no mandate from its people. It lacks that true independence which is a basic attribute of a sovereign state.

The purpose of the Soviets in putting forward the proposal is all too clearly to perpetuate the partition of Germany. I repeat, therefore, that this proposal is not acceptable.

Western Proposal for Continuing Discussions

In rejecting the Soviet proposal for an all-German committee, however, the Governments of France, Great Britain, and the United States refuse to abandon their 14-year-old effort to achieve the reunification of Germany in freedom. This is a responsibility which they share with the Soviet Union.

The Western peace plan testifies to our continued search for the means to this end. It also testifies to our willingness to meet Soviet criticisms of past plans. Unhappily, Mr. Gromyko rejected the Western peace plan, despite its patent reasonableness and workability.

We must not flag in our efforts, notwithstanding rebuffs, rejections, and obstructions thrown up in our path. The German people want reunification. Justice demands it. Indeed, all those who have a stake in future peace demand it.

The Foreign Ministers of France, Great Britain, and the United States, ever since the Soviet Foreign Minister rejected the Western peace plan, have been considering how the three of us together with our Soviet colleague could best continue to discharge our responsibility for the German question as a whole, which includes the matter of reunification and a peace settlement with Germany. I say a peace settlement with Germany, rather than with two parts of Germany, as the Soviets propose, because there can be no peace settlement unless all of Germany is

represented in its negotiation by the freely chosen government of a reunified Germany. The Soviet Union itself recognizes this principle, at least in form, when it speaks of a peace treaty with Germany—even though what it goes on to propose are peace treaties with parts of a divided Germany.

The three Western Foreign Ministers have concluded that there is a sensible and businesslike way of continuing a common search for the road to reunification and a peace settlement with Germany.

Our proposal is as follows:

The Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers, as at present constituted, shall continue in being for the purpose of considering the German problem as a whole. It should also consider questions relating to the extension and development of contacts between the two parts of Germany. For these purposes the conference shall meet from time to time at such level and at such place as are agreed. The conference may also make special arrangements for the consideration of particular questions arising out of its terms of reference as defined above.

This proposal would enable representatives of our four Governments to keep under continuing discussion a problem which is of major importance to each of us, to the German people, and indeed to peoples throughout the world. It will permit a thorough consideration of the Western peace plan—the most comprehensive plan yet developed for solving the problem of a divided Germany.

It would enable the Four Powers to utilize German advisers following the practice adopted by the present conference.

It would provide, by its terms of reference, for this conference to consider all the subjects which the Soviet Foreign Minister cataloged in his proposal of June 19. He proposed then that the all-German committee

. . . should promote the extension and development of contacts between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany, discuss and work out concrete measures for the unification of Germany, and consider questions pertaining to the preparation and conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany.

The three Western Powers submit this proposal, after careful and serious deliberation, in an effort to meet the desire of the Soviet Foreign Minister that we here agree on a method for continuing discussions looking to German unification—but in a manner that is consistent with our respective responsibilities. The U.S.S.R. Foreign Minister

⁴ *Ibid.*, Aug. 1, 1955, p. 176.

has offered to accept any procedure for considering the problem of divided Germany which is acceptable to the Germans. I am informed that the procedure here proposed is acceptable to the Federal Republic of Germany, the legitimate authority representing 51 million Germans.

I hope that the Soviet Foreign Minister will consider this proposal carefully. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF JULY 22

I would like to speak very briefly, on behalf of the United States delegation, on one matter. And that concerns the linkage which the Soviet Union is seeking to establish between the questions of German unification and an interim Berlin arrangement. This matter was referred to again by Mr. Gromyko in the speech he has just concluded.

This attempted linkage illustrates a very real difference which, I believe, lies at the root of much of the difficulty we are now having in reaching agreement at this conference. That difference arises out of the basic fact that the free world pursues a strategy of consent in international affairs, while the Communists pursue a strategy of duress.

For example, the Soviet Union created this year's Berlin crisis with a threat that, if the Western Powers did not accept their Berlin proposal by May 27, the Soviets would attempt to extinguish Western rights in Berlin. This was an application of the traditional Communist strategy of duress. It did not succeed.

Another Application of Duress

The Soviet Union is now engaged in another application of this strategy of duress in an effort to capitalize on the Western Powers' desire to end the Berlin crisis.

The Soviet Union is saying, in effect, that it will end the Berlin crisis—for a while—but only at a price. That price is Western acceptance of the Soviet proposal that the problem of a divided Germany be put in the hands of a committee of Communist Germans and free Germans. We are told, at least implicitly, that if this price is not paid—if we do not agree to the formation of this committee—the U.S.S.R. will try to make our position in Berlin impossible.

If accepted, this Soviet proposal would result in still a third, and even more dangerous, application of the strategy of duress.

The committee of Communist and free Germans would be given but a short time to solve a difficult problem with which the Four Powers have wrestled unsuccessfully since the war. Failure in its task would be assured by the basic fact that the leaders of the Soviet Government and of the so-called German Democratic Republic have made crystal clear that they will never agree to reunification of Germany under conditions which did not assure the communization of the Federal Republic. Such a committee would have no chance of success.

Price of Failure

And what is the price of failure?

Significantly, the U.S.S.R.'s proposal for a Berlin arrangement includes the termination of the arrangement at the same time scheduled for the expiration of the life of the "mixed committee." The price for the Federal Republic of Germany and for the Western Powers would thus be another threat to their West Berlin brothers in freedom. The price of failure for the East Germans would, by the same token, be the prospect of another attempt by their Soviet friends to help East Germany annex West Berlin.

This, then, would be the final element of the three-stage strategy of duress in which the Soviets are now engaged, if we accepted the Soviet proposals for an all-German committee and for an interim Berlin arrangement with the same time limit.

In devising these proposals, the Soviet Government has constructed an ingenious device whereby it clearly hopes to apply pressure on the Western allies eventually to accept changes injurious to their rights and interests in respect of either Berlin or Germany—or preferably both.

Mr. Gromyko has made this intent quite evident in the present negotiations.

First, he suggests that the all-German committee be given a year and a half in which to complete its labors. If at the end of that time it fails to agree, then, Mr. Gromyko explains, there will be no point in its continuing to discuss German unity and the Soviet Union will enter into new negotiations about Berlin and apparently about a German peace treaty, too, with the Western Powers.

Mr. Gromyko has given us certain assurances that no unilateral action will be taken during these subsequent negotiations. He has been careful, however, to say nothing about what will happen if these negotiations fail—as the Soviet Union can quickly cause them to do.

He has thus refused to give us any assurance that the Soviet Union will not, soon after expiration of the year and a half period which he has proposed, sign a separate peace treaty with the so-called German Democratic Republic—a treaty which the Soviet Union would then claim extinguished all Western rights in Berlin.

The coincidence of the expiration dates for the interim agreement on Berlin and on the life of the all-German committee must thus, according to Soviet calculation, insure one of two results.

Either the Federal Republic will capitulate in the all-German committee to any and all demands of the so-called German Democratic Republic in an effort to avert unilateral Soviet action in Berlin, or the Soviet Union will use the lack of progress in the all-German committee as the pretext for confronting the three Western Powers with what the Soviets would expect to be an impossible situation in West Berlin.

In effect, what the Soviet Union is proposing to do is to hold for ransom a whole city—2 million human beings. And the Soviet Union even suggests that we should become its unwitting accomplice in this deal by agreeing to the very arrangements which would make this possible.

This, in brief, is why the Soviet Union proposes that the questions of the all-German committee and of any interim agreement on Berlin be inextricably linked.

This, in brief, also is why the Western Powers reject this linkage.

STATEMENT OF JULY 23

At the outset let me ask for your indulgence if in the few remarks that I am about to make I cover some of the same ground which Mr. Selwyn Lloyd just covered so clearly and directly in dealing with the question of the so-called all-German committee. If some of my remarks appear to be repetitive, it is, I think, only an indication that we feel very strongly on the points which have been brought out during the course of the discussions.

This conference is seized, as you pointed out yesterday, Mr. Chairman, with two separate issues: what should be the procedures for future discussion of the problem of Germany as a whole, and what should be the terms of an interim arrangement for Berlin.

Yesterday I indicated why my Government could not accept the Soviet proposal for linking these two problems under an arrangement which would leave the Soviet Union free, after a specified period, to take unilateral action against Berlin if there were lack of progress toward German unity.

Any interim arrangements which thus permitted the Berlin crisis to be revived after a short interval would establish, for all practical purposes, exactly the kind of tie between an interim arrangement for Berlin and the question of German unity which could be exploited to apply pressure both on the German people and the three Western Powers on the two issues.

Since I believe that these two issues—however important each of them may be—should not thus be linked in any conference agreement, I also believe that it would be more orderly for this conference to address them separately. I gather that this procedure is agreeable in view of Mr. Gromyko's statement of yesterday that we should exchange views pertaining to an interim solution on Berlin in order to evaluate "the difficulties which we have to overcome and to clarify those possibilities which exist in order to arrive at an agreement and to realize those possibilities."

If we are to discuss these two questions separately, I would like today both to conclude my previous discussion of the Soviet proposal for a mixed German committee and to indicate where I believe that this discussion leaves this conference as far as its future work is concerned.

Soviet Proposal Unacceptable

I will begin, Mr. Chairman, by summarizing the principal reasons why the Soviet proposal for a mixed committee of free and Communist Germans is unacceptable to the Western Powers.

Mr. Gromyko has tried to give the impression of surprise at our refusal to agree that such a committee would, as he put it in his proposal of June 19, "promote the extension and development of contacts between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany,

discuss and work out concrete measures for the unification of Germany, and consider questions pertaining to the preparation and conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany."

With an air of reasonableness, he told us that nothing would be more logical than arranging for the Germans to get together to discuss and agree on matters vitally affecting their own future. He went on to suggest that it is only blindness, obstinacy, and revanchist-mindedness which stands in the way of the Four Powers' reaching agreement on his proposal.

When we pointed out that the outcome of any such confrontation of representatives of the Federal Republic and of the so-called German Democratic Republic would be an early and total deadlock, Mr. Gromyko asked how we could be sure of the outcome before we had given the proposal a trial.

We have explained to Mr. Gromyko that we can be sure of the outcome for the simple reason that the highest personages of the Soviet Government and of the so-called German Democratic Republic have made crystal clear that they will never agree to the reunification of Germany under conditions which did not guarantee the communization of the Federal Republic of Germany.

The all-German committee, under the terms of reference proposed by the Soviet Union, is thus not worth the trial because the outcome of the experiment is entirely predictable in advance. It is also not worth the trial for three other reasons:

First, by the device of this proposal, the Soviet Government very cleverly seeks to have its cake and eat it, too.

The Soviet Government tells us that reunification is none of our affair and that we should turn this over to the Germans to work out among themselves. This is a strange position for the Soviet Union to take when its own national interests are so clearly identified with the terms and conditions under which Germany will be reunified.

How does Mr. Gromyko resolve this problem? For, despite all its protests to the contrary, I cannot believe that the Soviet Union is actually willing to renounce its interest in the manner and terms of German reunification.

The answer is very simple if, as Mr. Selwyn Lloyd has pointed out, one understands the relationship between the men who head the regime of the so-called German Democratic Republic and

the Government of the Soviet Union. This relationship is such that it is impossible for representatives of the so-called German Democratic Republic to pursue a policy which is contrary to that which the Soviet Union considers to be in its own interest.

The negotiation in any all-German committee would thus not be a free one between two free governments. It would be a negotiation between one free government—the Federal Republic of Germany—and representatives of a regime who were, in fact, only speaking for the Soviet Union.

Four-Power Responsibility

This leads me to the second of the three reasons we reject the Soviet proposal.

If that proposal were put into effect, the three Western Powers would be compelled to abdicate their responsibility for assuring German reunification under conditions which would enable all Germans freely to determine the form of their own government. This, again, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd has developed. Equally important, they would have to abdicate their common responsibility for creating a reunited Germany in a framework of European security which would assure that war would not erupt again in the center of Europe, as it has twice in our own lifetime.

These are responsibilities and interests which the four of us share. They have been confirmed in past Four Power agreements, the latest of which was reached on July 23, 1955, when Chairman Bulganin subscribed, along with President Eisenhower, Sir Anthony Eden, and M. Faure to a document which included the following words:⁵

The Heads of Government, recognizing their common responsibility for the settlement of the German question and the re-unification of Germany, have agreed that the settlement of the German question and the re-unification of Germany by means of free elections shall be carried out in conformity with the national interests of the German people and the interests of European security.

No one can dispute that this language squarely reserved responsibility for German unification to the Four Powers. We do not propose here to enter into an agreement which sets this responsibility to one side.

The Soviet proposal would both maintain the Soviet Union in a position of responsibility and

⁵ *Ibid.*

control in regard to German reunification and exclude the Governments of France, Great Britain, and the United States from exercising the role in this process which their own interests require.

The third reason that we reject the Soviet proposal is because it would amount to our announcing to the world at large that we considered the regime in East Germany to be on a basis of equality with the freely chosen government of the Federal Republic of Germany. This for obvious reasons we are not willing to do, and the Soviet Government knew that we were not willing to do so when it framed this proposal. For these reasons, as well as because its labors would be doomed to failure from the start, we cannot accept the Soviet proposal for an all-German committee.

Two Basic Difficulties

There are thus, as I see it, two basic difficulties with which this conference is confronted, apart from the very important problem of the terms of an interim agreement on Berlin:

First, the Soviet Union's insistence, which I have just discussed, that we must agree to its proposal for a mixed German committee—or to some variant which would have the same effect.

Second, the Soviet Union's attempt to so arrange matters that the Western Powers will be exposed to unilateral action in Berlin after a specified period, if there is no progress toward German unity.

There is clearly little hope for success of this conference unless each of these obstacles can be overcome. The Western Powers have made constructive proposals to meet each of these difficulties.

First, they have suggested that the present conference continue its consideration, with German advisers, of the questions of German unification, a peace treaty, and inter-German contacts. This would permit the range of issues that Mr. Gromyko has in mind to be discussed, in such forms as may be judged appropriate, but without abrogating the basic Four Power responsibility that the U.S.S.R. has repeatedly acknowledged in the past. Second, the Western Powers have indicated their willingness—whether or not an agreement is here concluded on procedures for future

discussions of German unity—to enter into an interim Berlin agreement which is not tied to a coterminous time period for work on German unification. It should be clear, however, that the arrangements provided for by such an agreement could be altered, if it came up for review, only by negotiation—not by force. The Western Powers call for consent, rather than duress, as the means of possibly revising any temporary Berlin arrangements into which they might enter.

I believe that these Western proposals go far toward meeting some of the views that have been expressed by Mr. Gromyko and that they offer a sound basis for agreement.

I must say, in all candor, however, that I see no evidence that Mr. Gromyko regards them as anything but milestones in a negotiating process that leads inexorably toward agreement on Soviet terms. He appears to mistake the moves that we have made to meet him halfway as signs of weakness, which can be exploited through continuing pressure.

I want to assure Mr. Gromyko, in all seriousness, that this is not the case.

Letters of Credence

Brazil

The newly appointed Ambassador of Brazil, Walther Moreira Salles, presented his credentials to President Eisenhower on July 23. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 538 dated July 23.

Dominican Republic

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Dominican Republic, Luis F. Thomen, presented his credentials to President Eisenhower on July 20. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 531 dated July 20.

Sudan

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Republic of the Sudan, Osman el-Hadari, presented his credentials to President Eisenhower on July 21. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and

the President's reply, see Department of State press release 532 dated July 21.

Secretary Herter Reaffirms U.S. Commitment to Berlin

On July 25 Secretary Herter flew to Berlin from the Foreign Ministers Meeting at Geneva. Following are statements made by Mr. Herter upon his arrival at Templehof Airport and during a ceremony at the Rathaus later that day, together with his remarks at the dedication of a street in the Tiergarten as John Foster Dulles Allee.

ARRIVAL STATEMENT

Press release 541 dated July 24

I arrive with sincere pleasure at this airport of Free Berlin. This airport has played a historic role as an important part of Berlin's lifeline to the West, and the monument in the square at its entrance pays tribute to those heroic men who died during the airlift to keep this lifeline open.

My memories of this great city, the national capital of a reunited Germany, go back more than 40 years to the time when I was stationed at our Embassy here.

As you know, we have been discussing at Geneva the problem of a divided Berlin. I am grateful that the kind invitation of Governing Mayor [Willy] Brandt, on an occasion honoring Mr. John Foster Dulles, has given me the opportunity to come and see for myself what the Berliners have accomplished. Within the relatively short time I shall be here, I hope to obtain some general impressions of Berlin and of the indomitable spirit for which its population is renowned. I shall look forward also to meeting officials of the representative government of free West Berlin and to hearing their views.

Finally, this visit will give me an opportunity to consult with those American officials here who bear the local responsibility for carrying out our obligations to the people of West Berlin.

I know that I, and the members of the American delegation to the Geneva conference accompanying me, will leave here with an enhanced appreci-

ation of the values of freedom which West Berlin so well symbolizes.

STATEMENT AT RATHAUS

Press release 546 dated July 27

It is a privilege for me to be able to visit the city of Berlin on the occasion of the dedication of a street named in honor of my distinguished predecessor, Mr. John Foster Dulles. This gesture to his memory is greatly appreciated not only by my Government but also by the American people. Mr. Dulles was always keenly aware of the essential values which Berlin embodies. He came to this city four times during the post-World War II period and was able to observe, from visit to visit, the notable progress made in economic, cultural, and political reconstruction. On several occasions he expressed the view that a visit to Berlin, or, failing that, a knowledge of its post-war history, was essential to an understanding of the significance of the major issues dividing Europe today.

As some of you may know, I was stationed in Berlin as attaché of embassy as far back as 1916. Since then I have returned to this city several times. However, this is my first visit since 1947. I am looking forward to the tour around your city which is to take place later this afternoon. I have already been impressed by the many visible evidences I have seen of achievement in the field of reconstruction as well as by the imaginative willingness to experiment in new forms of architecture and urban design. No one can be ignorant of this record of achievement in the postwar period, a record which is all the more impressive when one considers the almost universal destruction of the city at the termination of hostilities in 1945.

The United States is proud to have been able to assist in this reconstruction and to know that there are throughout Berlin a number of tangible examples of my country's continuing interest in this city. But basically the postwar record of Berlin has derived from the special qualities of the Berliners themselves—their courage, their wit, their wry humor in the face of adversity, and their willingness to build for the future in the midst of an uncertain present. This spirit and vision is not only commendable; it is something we all need in some measure, and it is good that

the free world has the Berliners to set it this example.

Berlin, too, has been fortunate in the high quality of its leadership during these 14 years. Its Governing Mayors have become internationally recognized figures who by their courage and their willingness to speak frankly have in effect become spokesmen for the free world. Your present Governing Mayor, Willy Brandt, carries on in this great tradition.

I will not say much here about the conference in Geneva to which I shall be returning.¹ We enter Monday upon our ninth week in the search for some settlement which is consistent with our obligations to the free people of Berlin. We do not underestimate the gravity of the task, nor will we, out of impatience, agree to an arrangement which is inconsistent with those obligations.

I need not point out to you the origins of the present Berlin crisis. It began on November 10, 1958, with a Soviet announcement of intention to take unilateral action.² The world could not but recognize that this threat is the Berlin crisis.

Much has been said at Geneva about the question of Western rights in Berlin. These rights are clear and cannot be terminated by the unilateral action of any other power. We have not accepted and will not accept any deadline on them.

Throughout our deliberations the three powers responsible for West Berlin have been united both in firmness of purpose and coordination of effort. This close and friendly cooperation will continue.

On May 14, at the very beginning of the Geneva Foreign Ministers Conference, the Western delegations put forth a peace plan which would, by steps, lead to the reunification of Germany through the holding of free elections in the entire country. The Western Powers have by no means given up this plan and will work tirelessly for a reunified Germany in which all of its citizens including those of a reunited Berlin would enjoy

¹ For statements made by Secretary Herter at Geneva on July 20, 22, and 23, see p. 191.

² On Nov. 10, 1958, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev made a speech to a visiting Polish delegation, the substance of which was later embodied in the Soviet note of Nov. 27. For text of note, see BULLETIN of Jan. 19, 1959, p. 81.

the same rights now known in the Federal Republic.

On several occasions in the past, spokesmen for the Government of the United States have reaffirmed the basic commitment to Berlin given by the three Western Powers. This commitment was set forth in the tripartite declaration of October 3, 1954.³ The most recent of these occasions, which took place in this same building, was during the last visit to Berlin in May 1958 of John Foster Dulles.⁴ This is a binding commitment, and the United States will abide by it.

I know that the people of West Berlin regard our troops, and those of France and the United Kingdom, as defenders of their freedom. I know too that the presence of these troops, which will be preserved, is indispensable to the continuance of that freedom in the three Western sectors of the city.

I will leave Berlin regretting that my stay here could not have been longer. This is truly an island of freedom, significant both as symbol and as reality. That freedom is a precious thing. It includes the right of free speech so essential to the functioning of democracy. That right as well as all other fundamental rights and liberties must and will be preserved. I assure the Berliners that the United States will not forget its responsibilities toward Berlin in this or any other respect.

REMARKS AT DEDICATION OF JOHN FOSTER DULLES ALLEE

Press release 543 dated July 25

The dedication of this street to the memory of John Foster Dulles necessarily includes an element of sorrow. For me, who had the privilege of serving closely with Secretary Dulles, there is the personal regret at the loss of a strong comrade-in-arms.

For the people of Berlin this dedication is a tribute to one of their stanchest defenders. I am grateful to his sister, Eleanor Dulles, another warm friend of Berlin, for flying from Washington to attend this ceremony.

Berlin held a special place in the heart of John Foster Dulles because it is an exposed outpost of

³ For text, see *ibid.*, Oct. 11, 1954, p. 521.

⁴ *Ibid.*, May 26, 1958, p. 854.

freedom and because the people of Berlin had shown themselves ever ready to defend that freedom. Up to the very end of his life, in the midst of great pain and suffering, Mr. Dulles continued his efforts to insure their protection, to devise guarantees for their safety.

In so doing, he displayed that courage which was one of his finest attributes and which is, in time of trouble, a required attribute of man. Never was his courage more clearly displayed perhaps than in the last of his missions. Already heavily attacked by that illness from which he was soon to die, Secretary Dulles made the last painful journey to London, Paris, and Bonn to strengthen the resolution of the West in the face of the threats against this city.

I take this opportunity to thank the Government of West Berlin for so honoring John Foster Dulles. The proud name of this street in West Berlin should provide a constant reminder of our continuing need for that courage which he showed in the face of adversity and threat.

U.S. and Soviet Scientists To Exchange Visits

The Department of State announced on July 21 (press release 535) that the National Academy of Sciences had signed an agreement on July 9 with the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences providing for a number of exchanges of visits between scientists of the two countries in the next 2 years.

Discussions between the two academies, leading up to this accord, were initiated as a consequence of the agreement on exchanges signed at Washington on January 27, 1958,¹ between the Soviet Union and the United States. That agreement specifically provided that exchanges of visits by scientists of each country would be arranged by the two academies and assigned joint responsibility for agreeing on details to the academy presidents.

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Feb. 17, 1958, p. 243.

Captive Nations Week, 1959

A PROCLAMATION¹

WHEREAS many nations throughout the world have been made captive by the imperialistic and aggressive policies of Soviet communism; and

WHEREAS the peoples of the Soviet-dominated nations have been deprived of their national independence and their individual liberties; and

WHEREAS the citizens of the United States are linked by bonds of family and principle to those who love freedom and justice on every continent; and

WHEREAS it is appropriate and proper to manifest to the peoples of the captive nations the support of the Government and the people of the United States of America for their just aspirations for freedom and national independence; and


WHEREAS by a joint resolution approved July 17, 1959, the Congress has authorized and requested the President of the United States of America to issue a proclamation designating the third week in July 1959 as "Captive Nations Week," and to issue a similar proclamation each year until such time as freedom and independence shall have been achieved for all the captive nations of the world:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, President of the United States of America, do hereby designate the week beginning July 19, 1959, as Captive Nations Week.

I invite the people of the United States of America to observe such week with appropriate ceremonies and activities, and I urge them to study the plight of the Soviet-dominated nations and to recommit themselves to the support of the just aspirations of the peoples of those captive nations.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this seventeenth day of July in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred [SEAL] and fifty-nine, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and eighty-fourth.



By the President:

DOUGLAS DILLON,
Acting Secretary of State.

¹ No. 3303; 24 Fed. Reg. 5773.

The Developing Nations of the Far East: Their Relation to U.S. Security

by J. Graham Parsons

Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs¹

In treating any subject as broad as "the developing nations of the Far East"—for they are all "developing" countries—I shall have to be selective in what I say. The alternative is to give the area what our military friends prefer to call the broad-brush treatment, something which I do not wish to impose upon you. More importantly I regard this as an unusually useful and opportune occasion to voice some viewpoints on the Far Eastern scene, which I hope will supply grist for your discussions.

I assume from the title of this seminar ["World Battle Report: The Developing Nations"], as well as from its participation and venue, that national strategy and security are of principal concern to you. They certainly are the principal concern of those working on Far Eastern issues, and I would therefore propose to concentrate my remarks today on questions of security.

The military manpower superiority of the Sino-Soviet bloc and the dominant central position of an expansionist Communist China in the Far East pose grave problems for the security of that area. There is also the inescapable fact that Chinese Communists, like other Communists, are dedicated to the goal of world domination under the leadership of Moscow. Confronting Communist China are the free countries of the area, which, even together, are no match for the combined military might of the Sino-Soviet world. Their defensive position is further complicated by the fact that they are scattered narrowly around the fringe of the Sino-Soviet bloc, not in compact depth as in the case of Europe.

¹ Address made before the National Strategy Seminar for Reserve Officers at the National War College, Washington, D.C., on July 15.

Postwar History of Far East

The postwar history of the Far East may be divided for convenience' sake into several 5-year periods. The first 5-year period, 1945–50, was one marked by the forward flow of Communist power throughout mainland China, accompanied by the return to normalcy in the United States following its great World War II military efforts. It is no mere coincidence that Communist power rose in Asia in measure as we withdrew our boys back home and drastically cut our military budget. The second postwar period, 1950–55, introduced by the Communist onslaught in 1950 across the 38th parallel in Korea, was one of struggle to stem the forward Communist surge. This period was marked by the war in Korea, the war in Indochina, and by intensive Communist insurgent efforts in most of the other countries of southeast Asia. It was also marked by the rebuilding of our neglected military establishment and by the creation of a new Pacific alliance structure involving the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), our security treaty with Australia and New Zealand (ANZUS), and several bilateral pacts. The third postwar period, 1955 to the present, has been one of stabilization of the lines between the free world and the Communist bloc. There has been no transfer of territory in the Far East since early 1955. This third period has also been marked by increasing understanding on the part of the free Far Eastern countries of the nature of the many-faceted Communist threat and of the capability of these countries to cope with that threat.

What the fourth 5-year period, 1960–65, will bring will depend in no small degree on our own efforts. The consistency, the constancy, and the firmness we show in maintaining our position in

the Far East are, in my opinion, a vital element of success over the years ahead. Provided we follow through with the courses of action on which we are now embarked, I believe it well could be a period of increasing free-world growth against a background of competitive coexistence. This could lead to a situation where the Communists, perceiving a stronger, more resolved free Far East, would be less unwilling than at present to try to dispose of some of the cold war issues now contributing to the high state of tension in the area.

Free-World Security System

From this rapid sketch of the postwar Far Eastern scene, it will be appreciated that inevitably our attention during the past decade has been directed toward stemming raw military aggression and coping with Communist infiltration and subversion. We have been presented with a kind of menace that has required the erection of a sizable security structure comprising the three mutually supporting elements of alliances, U.S. bases, and the development of stronger friendly forces in the Far East. Evidently this structure has been effective in deterring war, and I believe it would be downright folly if we were now to tamper with any one of the elements in a structure which has proved to be so successful in the accomplishment of its aim. It is for this reason that Secretary Herter at his recent press conference² expressed such deep concern over what would amount to around a 45 percent cut in military assistance funds for non-NATO areas.

Whereas there seems to be general understanding in our country of the useful purposes served by our alliances and our farflung base structure, there is an understandable tendency to underestimate the importance of the armed strength of our friends and allies. I say "understandable" because, unless one travels about the Far East and actually sees not only the efficiency and determination of our allies but also their deterrent effectiveness, one could misjudge their importance. These forces are essential in identifying and helping to check local aggression. If they did not exist the whole task of maintaining peace in the Far East would fall on our shoulders at a cost, both in financial and political terms, which would be utterly prohibitive.

² BULLETIN of July 27, 1959, p. 107.

Offsetting the military hordes of Communist China, Russia, north Viet-Nam, and north Korea, the free nations of the Far East have nearly 2 million men under arms, most of them supported and trained with U.S. assistance. These forces, plus our forces and bases, most of them brought together under a system of alliances, constitute the free world's security system in the Far East. They are an indispensable part of the balance, the equilibrium, which is even more necessary today when the arrogance and truculence of the Chinese Communists are perhaps more menacing than ever before.

Continuing Communist Threats

All signs point to the likelihood that the Communists will continue to employ force and threats in the pursuit of their expansionist aims. For example, in the past year we have seen brutal repression in Tibet, the attack on the offshore islands, an intensified Communist "hate America campaign" throughout the Far East, and the imposition of a commune system that has sinister militaristic overtones. Exerting tremendous efforts to improve its military machine and firmly aligned to a nuclear partner which has been increasingly disposed to throw the weight of its threats behind Communist Chinese actions, Communist China continues to present the free world with a grave military threat. If, as many forecast, the threat of Communist aggression shifts in the direction of subtler and more ambiguous local thrusts and if, meanwhile, our capabilities continue to be directed toward deterring or meeting larger war situations, then our allies in the Far East become increasingly important in complementing our capabilities, notably in conventional or smaller warfare situations.

The fact of the matter is that our Far Eastern friends, whatever their desire and determination may be to remain independent, simply are not going to be able to stand up against Communist encroachments if they feel that the power of the free world is receding from their shores. Thus it is not merely a matter of whether or not the Chinese Communists are going to resort to overt military force in the foreseeable future; it is essentially a question of whether our distant friends feel we are going to stand behind them and whether our overall military posture vis-a-vis the bloc remains at least as strong as it now is.

It follows that our country, together with our allies, must not only maintain an adequately powerful military posture vis-a-vis the bloc but also that we must have the capability and determination to project that power rapidly and effectively.

Situation in the Taiwan Strait

Such a situation arose last August in the Taiwan Strait. I believe Henry Kissinger³ has made the observation that the Communists are ever likely to pose challenges in such a manner that the risks will seem disproportionate to the objectives in dispute. Thus the attack made upon the exposed Quemoy Islands was evidently launched in the hope that a U.S. failure to support the Chinese Nationalists in their defense of the islands would result in the collapse of morale on Taiwan and the Communist takeover of Taiwan from within. With the 7th Fleet guarding the straits, the Chinese Communists know full well that they cannot take Taiwan except by subversion.

The United States is explicitly committed to the defense of Taiwan under its mutual defense agreement with the Republic of China. It is not similarly committed to the defense of the offshore islands, but a 1955 joint resolution of Congress⁴ authorizes the President to employ the Armed Forces of the United States to protect positions and territories now in friendly hands as he judges may be required and appropriate in assuring the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores. When the massive Communist artillery attack was launched against Quemoy on August 23 last year, the Chinese Communists made it clear through official statements, as well as by their actions, that their objective was Taiwan and not just the offshore islands. In fact I recall one Peiping statement referring to "Taiwan and the other offshore islands." Our reaction to this situation was immediately to augment United States forces in the Taiwan area. Rotational flights of F-100's to Taiwan were stepped up in frequency. The delivery of needed military equipment to the Republic of China was greatly expedited. Escort activities were undertaken. Through our actions we made it clear to both the Communists and the

³ Deputy Director, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University.

⁴ For text, see BULLETIN of Feb. 7, 1955, p. 213.

free Chinese just where we stood. We sought to avoid any enemy miscalculations on that score.

Events in the Taiwan Strait are too fresh in your mind to require any recounting at this time. The main point is that our determined efforts succeeded. Whereas there was considerable criticism in this country and in Europe of our actions back in August and the beginning of September when things looked darkest, it is worth noting that all during that time we were privately receiving some strong words of encouragement from leaders in many countries of the Far East who well recognized what would be the impact on their countries should this Communist aggression go unopposed. The fact that the United States stood firm in a most difficult controversial kind of situation has had a real impact on all exposed countries. The fact that the United States could rapidly mobilize and act, as well as cooperate closely with one of its Asian allies, was also widely noted. It also served to bring home to some who had not previously thought about it that U.S. China policy had a central relationship to the security of their own countries.

Importance of U.S. Economic Assistance

I do not disagree with those who contend that it is in the economic field that we may face our most severe challenges in the Far East in the coming years. I would emphasize, however, that our concern over the economic challenge should not prompt us to take actions which would weaken our military programs. Security is the essential back-drop before which economic progress must be made.

I do believe, however, that, while continuing with our military assistance programs on the scale reflected in the request submitted by the executive branch to Congress this year,⁵ we should be doing more in the way of helping to promote economic growth and stability in the Far East, for we must recognize that independence and improved standards of life are the dominant aims of Asians today. But in urging that we do more in the way of economic assistance, I do not wish to over-sell its effectiveness as a means of counteracting the Communist menace. Any economic assistance we are likely to give our friends will be far from adequate to meet their needs; it is only by tre-

⁵ *Ibid.*, Mar. 30, 1959, p. 427.

mendous efforts on their part that they will be able to achieve the rate of growth to which they aspire. In the short run our economic assistance is important in terms of showing our interest and concern for recipient countries and in helping to encourage the standing of governments which are tackling the difficult tasks they face. In the longer run economic assistance is important in promoting progress, providing jobs and new opportunities, and instilling hope and confidence.

In the field of economic competition and warfare, the challenge in the Far East is posed largely in terms of the possibility that Communist China will be able to achieve its "great leap forward" and that its economic progress will greatly outstrip that of its free-world neighbors. This would not only have a baleful psychological impact upon Asia, but it would leave Communist China with greater means to ply her trade-warfare tactics against countries already vulnerable because of their dependence on one or two main crops or raw materials. Whether or not Communist China succeeds in its ambitious economic goals will depend upon factors largely beyond our control. Right now the Communists seem to be running into all sorts of difficulties—bottlenecks, dislocations, dissatisfaction, and widespread unrest—and in the long, long run it seems hard to believe that human beings will accept a system of rule which is in such direct conflict with human nature itself. However, there is no law that says they cannot succeed, and we would be most unwise to assume so.

Political Questions

Turning to political matters, one of the major needs in the area is for improved cooperation among countries of the Far East. Such is the diffusion, contrast, and separation of the various countries that many of them tend to be relatively unaware of events transpiring even in their immediate neighborhood. It is essential that more be done to develop awareness of problems in neighboring free countries, because only by understanding these problems can there be an atmosphere conducive to greater cooperation. At present it would seem that regionalism is most likely to emanate slowly from specific practical projects of common interest, such as the project for developing the Mekong Valley. It can also develop from increased professional and cultural contacts and from visits and discussions among the statesmen

of the area. Highways between countries would do more than link them physically.

Another political question which has generated considerable interest lately has been the changes in several governments in the Afro-Asian area which would suggest at first glance that the first experiments in democracy might have failed. I think we should be careful not to reach any such conclusion, for we must take into account the long centuries of quite different history and social conditions prevailing in Asia. What they have accepted in the way of democracy is the spirit of democracy and the principles behind democracy rather than the precise forms and instrumentalities which we have followed in the West. The important thing is that human liberties be preserved, and I believe that throughout the arc of free Asia you will find that there is not just a genuine desire but also a vested interest in the retention of human liberties. These liberties may be challenged from time to time, but I have little doubt that they will survive. The stark alternative—the suppression of human values under communism—is ever more repugnant to these new countries of the area.

I recently concluded a visit to all 13 countries which we designate as the Far East. I returned from this trip with certain clear impressions, and I would say heartening impressions, about the progress that is going on there.

First of all, it was obviously true that one of the most powerful generic forces counteracting Communist advances today is nationalism. The nations that have recently acquired independence are determined to keep it. They are suspicious and resentful of any nation seen as attempting to compromise or abridge that freedom. Originally all that suspicion and resentment was directed toward the ex-colonial powers, but it has become increasingly manifest to these new nations that it is Communist China and other bloc powers, not the Western nations, which are out to subvert and dominate free Asia. As anti-Western colonialism recedes and Communist imperialism persists, nationalism will be a growing asset in the struggle for freedom. It is we, not the Communists, who will become increasingly identified with that nationalism, for day by day the contrast between the motivations of the Communists and of the free world becomes ever more clear.

Secondly, whereas at one time not so many years ago communism held a certain appeal among

various of the intelligentsia of the Far East and whereas at that time the great mass of people were quite ignorant of communism's aims and methods, I believe this is much less true today. Certainly no free Far Eastern country today wants Communist solutions, for the very simple reason that they all set too high a value on their independence and on their own way of life. It is only natural that they should have turned to the United States for assistance because they know that we share their aims of preserving national independence while promoting human liberties and improving conditions of life.

Finally, in traversing the Far East, one is continually struck by the tremendous responsibility which our country has assumed in that part of the world. The fact that the countries of that area look so directly to us for leadership and for assistance is sobering yet challenging. We must demonstrate ever more clearly that we are interested in them as people, that we are *for* them, not merely *against* communism. We have invested a tremendous amount of labor in successfully assisting in the progress of these countries, and we have great opportunities for carrying forward with the tasks on which we are now embarked. I sincerely trust that we will not be deflected from our worthwhile purposes.

Medical Group To Visit Asia on Cholera Research Project

Press release 544 dated July 25

A team of six U.S. scientists, headed by Joseph E. Smadel, associate director of the National Institutes of Health, will leave Seattle on August 1 for the Far East and South Asia in connection with the development of a cholera research project approved by the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). Approval was given at the SEATO Council Meeting which was held in Wellington, New Zealand, last April.¹

The United States has allocated \$400,000 from the President's Fund for Asian Economic Development, a part of mutual security program appropriations, for the cholera research project, designed to bring American research scientists into working cooperation in this field with their Asian counterparts. The \$400,000 contribution has been

assigned by the International Cooperation Administration to the National Institutes of Health of the Public Health Service of the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. The National Institutes of Health will in turn make further grants and contracts to carry out various phases of the project.

The U.S. scientists accompanying Dr. Smadel on the 1-month exploratory trip are John H. Dingle of Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio; Kenneth Goodner of Jefferson Medical College, Philadelphia, Pa.; Colin M. MacLeod of the John Herr Musser Department of Research Medicine, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa.; Col. Richard P. Mason, Director of the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, Washington, D.C.; Theodore E. Woodward, University of Maryland School of Medicine, Baltimore, Md.

The group will visit the Philippines, Thailand, and Pakistan specifically in connection with the SEATO cholera research project. All three nations are members of SEATO. The team also will visit other countries where cholera and diarrheal diseases are public health problems, such as India and Iran.

The SEATO cholera research project involves the establishment of a research laboratory at an established institution in Southeast Asia, to be closely linked with research laboratories and the institutions of other countries as well. Research activities would include epidemiological studies and bacteriological studies and, since cholera must be differentiated from other diarrheal diseases, studies of the type, distribution, and prevalence of these other diseases. Various SEATO countries are participating in the project.

Provision is made for training Asian citizens in investigative techniques, in the United States and in the field laboratory. The laboratory will have a director and assistant director selected by the National Institutes of Health.

Three laboratories in the United States, with interests in research in infectious diseases, will carry out basic research studies and will train Asian nationals. These are laboratories of the University of Chicago, whose project focuses on responses to vaccine and to the disease in immunized and nonimmunized persons; Jefferson Medical College, which is to make a fundamental investigation on the cholera organism, its growth forms and other characteristics; and the Univer-

¹ BULLETIN of Apr. 27, 1959, p. 602.

sity of Pittsburgh, which will study viral agents which may be associated with, or involved in, susceptibility or resistance to cholera.

U.S. Protests Attack on Plane Over Sea of Japan

Press release 542 dated July 24

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

The senior member of the U.N. Command side of the Military Armistice Commission in Korea, Maj. Gen. William S. Biddle, has been instructed to protest the wanton attack on June 16 by two Communist MIG aircraft against a U.S. Navy patrol craft over the Sea of Japan. The protest is to be delivered to the Korean People's Army and Chinese People's Volunteers side at a meeting of the Military Armistice Commission which was called for this purpose today [July 24].

The U.S. plane was fired upon shortly after noon on June 16 in the course of a routine flight over the Sea of Japan. During its entire flight the U.S. plane was well away from land and over international waters. The attack occurred at a point approximately 78 miles east of Wonsan and 45 miles away from the nearest land.

The attack was made without warning in broad daylight, under conditions of unlimited visibility. In the course of this unprovoked aggression the tail gunner of the U.S. plane was seriously wounded, while the gun turret and the two starboard engines were put out of action.

Investigations conducted by the Department of Defense have left no doubt that the attacking planes came from north Korea and returned to north Korea after the attack. The attack is being protested on the grounds of being not only a flagrant breach of international law but also a violation of the obligations undertaken by the north Korean regime under the Korean Armistice Agreement to enforce a complete cessation of all hostilities. Since the Military Armistice Commission was set up to supervise the implementation of the armistice, the protest is addressed to the senior member of the Korean People's Army and Chinese People's Volunteers side.

TEXT OF PROTEST

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, has directed that this communication be presented to the Korean People's Army and Chinese People's Volunteers side.

Shortly after noon on 16 June 1959 MIG aircraft from your side attacked a four-engine Mercator (P4M) patrol airplane, clearly bearing United States Navy markings, at a point approximately 78 miles east of Wonsan, north Korea, and 45 miles northeast of the nearest land at the position 39°16.5' north, 129°07' east off the north Korean coast. This position was firmly established by a radar fix made by the plane's navigator at the precise moment the first firing run was made by the MIG's. Illegal and unprovoked, the attack occurred in conditions of unlimited visibility and in broad daylight.

In further detail, the two MIG type fighter aircraft bearing red star markings appeared at 1215 p.m., Korean time (0315 Greenwich time) high astern, without giving prior warning of any kind and already in their attacking runs. The second MIG passed overhead without firing but the first MIG opened fire on its initial pass, hitting the P4M on the port side. Employing standard belligerent fighter tactics, the MIG's made at least five more passes, three of which were definitely firing runs. During the second firing run, the P4M tail gunner was seriously wounded, receiving over 50 shrapnel wounds in his right leg, hands, neck and head; his gun turret was put out of action. Subsequent hits put both starboard engines out of commission and damaged several control elements.

Immediately upon sighting the attacking MIG's, the pilot sent out a distress call and maneuvered the P4M down to an altitude of fifty feet above the water. The MIG's followed the P4M down and pressed home their belligerent attacks for approximately five minutes. After breaking off the last attack, the MIG's pulled straight up to a high altitude and returned to north Korea. Subsequent investigation revealed that they were tracked from a point off your coast to the interception and from there back to your coast by land-based radar of our side.

The above facts leave no doubt that the attacking planes came from north Korea and that the intercept and attempted shootdown were premeditated and intentional.

During its entire flight and, specifically, at the time of intercept and attack, the P4M was well away from land and was over international waters. It should be noted that for a period of 25 minutes immediately prior to the attack the P4M had been on a heading which would have taken it to a point on the Korean coast south of the United Nations true line. Coincident with the beginning of the attack, the P4M was commencing a left turn to the southeasterly course away from land. These facts and the routine nature of the flight are positive proof the attack was completely unwarranted.

I would like to draw the attention of your side to the fact that patrol and reconnaissance squadrons of the United States and other nations continuously conduct

flights over the Sea of Japan for a variety of purposes. In addition to training flights, regular flights are made for shipping surveillance, air sea rescues, investigation of unidentified contacts, antisubmarine training and fleet exercises of all types. It should also be pointed out that Soviet and north Korean aircraft based in this area also engage in similar patrol and reconnaissance operations and have been frequently detected in the vicinity of Japan and the Republic of Korea. These aircraft have, however, never been attacked in any manner.

The United Nations Command hereby lodges a grave protest against this latest act of vicious and criminal aggression perpetrated by your side. Once again your side has demonstrated by this act of unprovoked belligerence and attempted murder over the high seas your complete lack of respect for your responsibilities under the Armistice Agreement to enforce a complete cessation of all hostilities and for the basic principles of international law and order.

You may be certain that the United Nations Command will continue to exercise its right to conduct flights over international waters. Your side will, of course, have to bear the full consequences of the continuing determination of the United Nations Command forces to defend themselves at all times against unprovoked barbaric aggression by your side.

It is demanded that your side take immediate and positive measures to insure that such unwarranted acts from your side are not repeated. It is further demanded that the persons responsible for this barbarous and unprovoked attack on an aircraft of our side be appropriately punished.

John Foster Dulles' Papers Given to Eisenhower Library

The Department of State announced on July 21 (press release 533) a gift by the late Secretary of State John Foster Dulles of certain of his personal papers to the projected Eisenhower Presidential Archival Library at Abilene, Kans.

Mr. Dulles had expressed the wish that the majority of his personal papers, including those dating back to his earliest entry into public life, go to Princeton University.¹ However, he had also separated out those personal papers dated during his tenure of office as Secretary of State which relate directly to his personal association with the President and with other high officials of the Eisenhower administration, and, under a provi-

¹ For an announcement of the establishment of the John Foster Dulles Library of Diplomatic History at Princeton University, see BULLETIN of June 1, 1959, p. 792.

sion of the Federal Records Act which permits the deposit of such papers in a Presidential archive under conditions agreed by the donor and by the Administrator of General Services, Mr. Dulles gave these papers to the Eisenhower Library at Abilene.

The Archivist of the United States feels that this gift by Mr. Dulles will be a tremendously significant addition to the collection of the Eisenhower Library.

President Signs Mutual Security Authorization Bill

Following is a statement made by President Eisenhower on July 24 upon signing H.R. 7500, a bill to amend further the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, and for other purposes. The bill authorizes total appropriations of \$3,556,200,000 for the fiscal year 1960 plus \$1.1 billion more to be advanced to the Development Loan Fund during fiscal 1961.

White House press release dated July 24

I have today [July 24] signed H.R. 7500, a bill amending the Mutual Security Act of 1954. Three amendments made by the bill concern disclosure by the executive branch of information, documents, and materials relating to the mutual security program or certain of its aspects.

I have signed this bill on the express premise that the three amendments relating to disclosure are not intended to alter and cannot alter the recognized constitutional duty and power of the Executive with respect to the disclosure of information, documents, and other materials. Indeed, any other construction of these amendments would raise grave constitutional questions under the historic separation-of-powers doctrine.

In this connection I am constrained to emphasize once again that it is established policy of the executive branch to provide the Congress and the public with the fullest possible information consistent with the public interest. This policy will continue to guide the executive branch in carrying out the mutual security program so that there may be a full understanding of the program and its vital importance to the national security.

Economic Assistance: Programs and Administration

LETTERS TRANSMITTING THIRD INTERIM REPORT OF DRAPER COMMITTEE

Following is a letter from President Eisenhower to Vice President Nixon transmitting a report dealing with U.S. programs of economic assistance made by the President's Committee To Study the United States Military Assistance Programs, together with a letter from the Committee submitting its third interim report to the President.

PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO MR. NIXON¹

White House press release dated July 23

JULY 23, 1959

DEAR MR. VICE PRESIDENT: I transmit for the consideration of the Congress a report on "Economic Assistance: Programs and Administration,"² submitted to me on July 13, 1959, by the President's Committee to Study the United States Military Assistance Program. This report analyzes the objectives of economic assistance, reports on the operations of present programs, and makes recommendations for future programs and organizational arrangements.

I have transmitted copies of the report to the Executive Agencies concerned, so that the Committee's recommendations may be carefully considered and, where appropriate, taken into account during the formulation of next year's mutual security program.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

The Honorable RICHARD M. NIXON
President of the Senate
United States Senate
Washington, D.C.

¹ An identical letter, with a copy of the report, was sent to Representative Sam Rayburn, Speaker of the House of Representatives.

² Copies of the report are available from the President's Committee To Study the United States Military Assistance Program, 708 Jackson Place, Washington 25, D.C.

COMMITTEE'S LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

JULY 13, 1959.

Dear Mr. President: We submit to you herewith our third Interim Report,³ which deals with United States programs of economic assistance. This present study, in conjunction with our previous work on military assistance, will form a basis on which we can give you in our final report considered views on "the relative emphasis which should be given to military and economic programs, particularly in the less developed areas . . ." as you have asked us to do.

We believe that lasting world peace will ultimately depend to a large degree upon more widely distributed economic progress and increased recognition of the importance and dignity of the individual. We also believe that economic aid, so administered as to facilitate achievement of these objectives, is an essential and continuing foreign policy tool of the United States.

The increasing communist threat to the free world is an indivisible military-economic-political menace. Recently we have seen a new aspect of this threat: the effective use by communist dictators of military and economic aid programs as an aggressive means of advancing their plans to take over or subvert additional countries.

We have kept in mind in our studies your reference in the Budget Message to our Committee in connection with the need for reassessing the "interrelationships of military and economic assistance" and "consideration of the new Communist techniques in waging the cold war."⁴ In meeting the multiple threat posed by the activities of international communism, we must utilize as needed both economic and military assistance. These programs are neither alternatives nor competitors. Both are means of achieving related aspects of our total foreign policy objectives, and they are mutually complementary.

Military assistance helps to build essential military strength, but armed forces are dependent as well upon the people and the government of the country and upon a sound economic base, including roads, railroads, food, fuel and power. Economic assistance can help to develop this base. On the other hand, sufficient military strength to provide a feeling of security is a first requisite for the order and confidence required in a country for economic

³ For text of the Committee's first interim report, see BULLETIN of June 1, 1959, p. 796; for the Committee's letter transmitting the second interim report (H. Doc. 186, 86th Cong., 1st sess.), see *ibid.*, July 13, 1959, p. 47.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Feb. 9, 1959, p. 198.

development. This is the purpose of our military assistance.

The Committee believes that the substantial expenditures made by our Government in recent years for economic assistance are justified on grounds both of enlightened self-interest and of our moral responsibility to ourselves to do what we can to help other peoples realize their legitimate aspirations.

Our economic aid programs assist less developed nations in achieving economic progress within the free world. They thereby promote an international climate which facilitates the realization of our own national objectives and those of the free world and, at the same time, decrease the opportunities for communist political and economic domination.

But irrespective of the communist threat, the economic development of these nations is a desirable end in itself. The United States cannot prosper in isolation. The strength of our economy and the survival of our free institutions are dependent upon our being a part of a community of nations which is making acceptable economic and political progress.

We emphatically do not imply that we must continue all of our existing economic assistance programs indefinitely. Our resources though great are not unlimited, and our obligations are many. In deciding the best use of our resources, we must be more selective in choosing those countries and projects which will yield the greatest results in increasing free world strength.

For this reason, as in the case of the military aid program, we emphasize the need for continuous critical review of economic aid programs. This review should take into account the ability of the other industrialized nations of the free world to play an increasing role, and the ability of the less developed nations themselves to provide a greater share of the resources needed. It should lead to the elimination of any programs that do not contribute directly to our national interests and to free world progress. Without such selectivity in administration, these essential programs will not endure.

We also emphasize that the economic development of a country is primarily its own responsibility. Aid from the United States and other free world nations can be of great assistance, but it should not ordinarily be furnished and cannot achieve real results unless the recipient nation has the desire and determination to help itself.

In the early period after World War II, United States economic assistance programs were considered to be temporary measures to achieve specific objectives such as the relief and rehabilitation of war-ravaged countries. The Marshall Plan for European economic recovery had a terminal date and came to an end in less than four years with its purposes successfully accomplished.

Today, however, we must recognize that many forms of United States economic assistance must continue for as long as the communist threat exists, and certainly until greater economic progress has been made in underdeveloped nations.

The increase in the number and types of aid programs and participating agencies has greatly complicated the problems of planning and administration. Not only must

various forms of United States aid be applied effectively in a particular country, but our contributions must be closely related to the efforts of the country itself. Actions and contributions by other free world nations, by international agencies, and by private enterprise must also be taken into account. Management of our aid activities has become an extraordinarily difficult administrative undertaking.

Our Committee is aware of the charges of waste and maladministration made in connection with our economic aid programs. While we believe that the administration and coordination of these programs has improved in recent years, there is no question but that some of these criticisms are justified. However, the conclusion we reach is that the programs must be continued and better administered, not emasculated or abandoned.

Our report, which is submitted herewith, is in two parts. The first deals with the substantive aspects of our economic assistance programs, and the second with their administration. Our principal substantive recommendations are:

Starting in Fiscal Year 1961, funds should be made available for development lending under the Mutual Security Program at the rate of at least \$1 billion a year. The amount requested for Fiscal Year 1960 should be provided.

A continuing authorization and longer range funding should be provided for the Development Loan Fund.

A continuing authorization should be provided for Technical Assistance.

Necessary legislative and administrative steps should be taken to assure that available surplus agricultural commodities are utilized more effectively, extensively and flexibly than at present, in support of our Mutual Security Program objectives.

Funds should be made available for Defense Support and Special Assistance in the amounts requested for Fiscal Year 1960. The United States should continue this needed grant assistance in support of necessary allied forces and other national objectives, subject to such reductions and eliminations as may become possible by (1) substitution of development loans and surplus agricultural products where practicable, and (2) changes in military or economic conditions in recipient countries. Greater efforts should be made to encourage such countries to stimulate their own exports in order to reduce the need for grant assistance.

Necessary legislative and administrative steps, including greater emphasis on the use of tax incentives and guarantees of private investments overseas, should be taken to stimulate increased participation by private enterprise, capital and management in foreign economic development in the less developed countries.

United States aid programs should place greater emphasis on the predominant responsibility of the countries being aided to take constructive steps to solve their own problems. Reasonable self-help efforts should ordinarily be a condition of United States assistance.

The United States should increase its emphasis on a multilateral approach to development assistance and

specifically should support the proposed International Development Association.

In order to meet more effectively the problems of economic development, the United States should, when requested by nations to which it is furnishing economic development assistance, assist them in formulating programs designed to deal with the problem of rapid population growth, and should support research leading to better understanding of this problem.

The second part of our report deals with the organization and administration of economic assistance programs. Our Committee believes that the central weakness in the present organization is that existing arrangements do not provide adequate means for planning, coordinating and carrying out the various forms of assistance as integrated country programs under the foreign policy direction of the Department of State. This weakness has been compounded as additional departments and agencies have become active in the foreign field.

Our principal recommendations on organization and administration are:

A single agency should be made responsible for administering the major related economic assistance programs and activities now scattered among a number of departments and agencies in Washington.

The Executive Branch should put into effect the policies and procedures for long range planning of economic assistance set forth in the report.

The personnel needs of the long range program of the proposed agency should be met by appointing an outstanding individual, acceptable to the Secretary of State, to head the agency; by providing the agency with its own personnel system, including a career service tailored to its needs; and by the other steps set forth in the report.

There should be more effective decentralization of responsibilities for economic assistance plans and programs to the Ambassadors and the Economic Mission Chiefs, with improved policy direction and other supporting arrangements to make such decentralization effective.

The functioning of the foreign policy direction and coordination of economic assistance programs by the Department of State should be strengthened, while clear responsibility for operations should be given to the single agency.

The operating agency might be placed as a semi-autonomous unit within the Department of State, or it could be located outside the Department. For the reasons set forth in the report, the Committee definitely favors the latter course.

Paralleling our conclusions concerning military assistance, we believe that an effective working relationship between the Department of State and the operating agency, wherever it is located, will require restraint by the Department against becoming involved in the details of operations, a willing acceptance by the proposed operating agency of competent and timely foreign policy direction. It will also require the development in the Department of a thoroughgoing capacity to provide this direction, and the establishment of a workable system

through which proper execution of plans and adequate opportunity to effect necessary changes in programs are assured. The central role in such a system of meaningful and effective foreign policy direction, utilized on behalf of the President and the Secretary of State, must be that of the Department of State.

In our judgment, adoption of the recommendations contained in the accompanying report, the more important of which are summarized above, should increase substantially the effectiveness of the economic assistance programs.

Respectfully submitted,

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WILLIAM H. DRAPER, Jr.

Chairman

THE PRESIDENT
The White House
Washington 25, D.C.

Spain To Get International Credits To Aid Stabilization Program

Press release 530 dated July 20

International credits amounting to \$375 million to assist the Government of Spain in carrying through its financial and economic stabilization program were announced on July 20 at the conclusion of negotiations between the Spanish Government and the International Monetary Fund, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, the U.S. Government, and private banks in the United States.

The discussions in the United States were completed with the visit to Washington of the Spanish Minister of Commerce, Alberto Ullastres, and other Spanish officials, who held talks with the International Monetary Fund and also with the Secretary of the Treasury, Robert B. Anderson; the Acting Secretary of State, Douglas Dillon; the President of the Export-Import Bank of Washington, Samuel Waugh; the Director of the International Cooperation Administration, James W. Riddleberger; and the Acting Managing Director of the Development Loan Fund, Robert B. Menapace.

The U.S. Government has expressed its support for the Spanish program, which is designed to contribute to the continued expansion of the Spanish economy in conditions of stability. The program involves both internal and external measures intended to contribute to financial stability within Spain, as well as to equilibrium in the Spanish external accounts together with a high level of foreign trade. In addition to internal fiscal and monetary measures the new steps include an important advance in trade liberalization on a nondiscriminatory basis, unification of exchange rates, and establishment of a par value for the peseta. The new Spanish program is described in detail in a statement issued on July 20 by the Spanish Government.

The U.S. Government also warmly welcomes the accession by Spain to full membership in the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, announced on July 20 at Paris. The United States is confident that Spanish membership in the OEEC will be of great value in promoting closer economic relations between Spain and the other 17 European member countries.

In view of the program adopted by Spain, the OEEC has agreed to extend to Spain credits equivalent to \$100 million out of the resources of the European Fund; the International Monetary Fund has agreed to make available to Spain the equivalent of \$75 million; and financial facilities will be provided from the U.S. sources amounting to about \$200 million.

The financial facilities to be provided to Spain from U.S. sources will consist of the following:

United States Government

Defense support assistance during fiscal year 1960, subject to congressional appropriations	\$40,000,000
Assistance to be extended by the Export-Import Bank for loans on industrial projects already under study	30,000,000
Sale to Spain, for payment in pesetas, of agricultural products to be agreed upon, pursuant to Public Law 480, estimated at an export value of	60,000,000
	130,000,000
<i>Private bank credits totaling about</i>	<i>70,000,000</i>
<i>Total</i>	<i>\$200,000,000</i>

The Export-Import Bank is prepared to consider other project applications from Spain after

the \$30 million in credits described above is utilized. In addition, further projects are presently under consideration by the Development Loan Fund.

The U.S. Government has also agreed to the use of 7.4 billion pesetas (equivalent to \$123.3 million at the new par value), drawn from the local currency proceeds of U.S. programs for Spain, to assist in financing the Spanish investment budget for 1959. This is intended as a further contribution to the Spanish stabilization program.

Development Loans

Korea

The U.S. Development Loan Fund on July 14 announced basic approval and commitment of funds for a \$5.6 million loan to the Oriental Chemical Industries Co., Ltd., a private Korean firm, to assist in the establishment of a soda-ash plant and related plants at Samchok. For details, see Department of State press release 515 dated July 14.

Lebanon

The Development Loan Fund on July 16 announced basic approval and commitment of funds for a \$500,000 loan to the Société d'Électricité d'El-Bared, S.A.L., a privately owned electric utility company in Lebanon, to help reconstruct a power plant on the El-Bared River. For details, see Department of State press release 522 dated July 16.

Thailand

The Development Loan Fund announced the signing of an agreement at Washington, D.C., on July 17 under which the DLF will lend \$750,000 to the Livestock Trading Corporation, Ltd., a privately owned firm in Bangkok, Thailand, to establish a modern, sanitary slaughtering and meat-processing plant at Bangkok. For details, see Department of State press release 525 (corrected) dated July 17.

Yugoslavia

The Development Loan Fund on July 15 announced basic approval and commitment of funds for a \$15 million loan to the Government of Yugoslavia to assist in constructing the initial stage of a hydroelectric project on the Trebisnjica River near Dubrovnik. For details, see Department of State press release 520 dated July 15.

Department's Views on Administration of Public Law 480

*Statement by Thomas C. Mann
Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs¹*

Thank you for this opportunity to present the views of the Department of State on general aspects of the administration of Public Law 480 [Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act]. The Department of Agriculture has already testified at some length, and I assume that the committee wishes me to direct my remarks primarily to the foreign policy aspects of the program.

I.

I wish to say in the beginning that the existence of agricultural surpluses in our country provides us with an opportunity, especially in the less developed parts of the world, to use them to improve standards of health and nutrition, to promote a more rapid rate of economic growth through development loans and grants from sales proceeds, to increase commercial marketings by expansion of food consumption, and to help nations cope with the difficult task of providing food for rapidly expanding populations.

The Department of State is therefore interested in finding ways to utilize our agricultural surpluses in the most effective way possible in the service of humanity and freedom.

We have made considerable progress. In the fiscal year just ended we have negotiated agreements with 23 governments for the sale under title I of agricultural products having a CCC [Commodity Credit Corporation] cost of approxi-

mately \$1,150,000,000. In addition, we are currently in the process of negotiating 8 additional agreements involving commodities having a CCC cost of about \$528,000,000 which, added to the previous figure, makes a total of about \$1,678,000,000. This is a record which, considering the difficulties involved, we may regard with some degree of satisfaction.

II.

In the search for ways to make a fuller and more effective use of our food surpluses, the United States took the lead in arranging last May an International Food for Peace Conference of the major wheat-exporting countries.² And in June a Food for Peace Wheat Utilization Committee was set up to consider specific program problems. There is reason to hope that we shall, as a result of these meetings, have better international understanding and better coordination in carrying out the objectives of the President's food-for-peace program.

Also there have been submitted to the Congress amendments to P.L. 480 designed, among other things, to:

- 1) increase the authorization under title I by \$1.5 billion, and under title II by \$300 million, both for the calendar year 1960;
- 2) permit under title I the grant of foods for the establishment of national food reserves and

¹ Made before the House Committee on Agriculture on July 15 (press release 519).

² For text of a joint communique, see BULLETIN of June 1, 1959, p. 793.

for certain development projects in less developed countries;

3) authorize the use of foreign currencies acquired for nonfood emergency relief;

4) authorize under title II the use of commodity grants and proceeds derived therefrom for economic development purposes not practical to administer under title I;

5) authorize the payment of general average claims for title II commodities involved in loss or damage actions against cargo shipments.

In addition, pursuant to the recommendations contained in the report of John Davis,³ the Berenson-Bristol-Straus report,⁴ and the Boeschenstein report,⁵ steps have been taken to liberalize loan terms and permit a more expeditious use of currencies for economic development. For instance, the National Advisory Council has approved a provision to eliminate the maintenance-of-value provisions in loans of local currency. The maintenance-of-value requirement has impeded negotiations with foreign governments simply because a borrower is unwilling to assume a long-term risk of devaluation when he can borrow from internal sources free of this risk. Also, we have adopted the practice of reaching mutual understanding on the principal features of the loan agreement at the time the sales agreement is negotiated. Again, our missions in the field have been given authority, subject to general guidelines, to conclude agreements for the use of local currency in specific projects and programs. Another change has been to use a larger part of the local-currency proceeds for grants to assist in financing non-self-liquidating projects, with the aim of increasing the attractiveness of the program, avoiding the excessive accumulation of local currencies, and promoting a more rapid economic growth of the country concerned.

These administrative changes will eliminate or diminish some of our negotiating difficulties and,

with the proposed legislative changes already referred to, will make the surplus disposal program more flexible and efficient.

There are, however, a number of considerations which we believe deserve the particular attention of this committee and of the Congress.

III.

First, there is a limit on the quantity of our surplus agricultural commodities which can be disposed of under Public Law 480 without injury to our economy, the economies of our friends and allies who export the same commodities, and the economies of the recipient countries themselves.

Countries with convertibility and balance-of-payments problems find it advantageous to purchase food with local currency, especially since a substantial part of the currency is returned to the country in long-term, low-interest loans for economic development. It is therefore not surprising that they sometimes seek title I commodities not only to obtain agricultural products which they would find it difficult to pay for in convertible currencies but as a substitute for commercial transactions for which they can allocate foreign exchange. If we were to permit this, our own commercial sales would inevitably decline, as would those of our friends and allies. This is why we strive to avoid displacing normal marketings.

It is sometimes thought that excessive disposals of agricultural surpluses are harmful only to those economies whose commercial exports are displaced. But the disposal of excessive quantities can be harmful to the recipient country itself.

For one thing, it can discourage domestic agricultural development by reducing producer incentives. The Argentine nation is today paying the price of austerity largely because its agricultural production, on which its economy rested, sharply declined because of previous price policies which removed the producers' incentive to raise livestock and grains. The reduction in agricultural production, in turn, contributed directly to balance-of-payments difficulties, which we have been helping to alleviate, and to inflation and rising costs of living, which it is not so easy to remedy quickly and painlessly.

Countries which are striving for rapid economic growth need all of the exchange they can get for the purchase of capital imports. Our disposal program contributes to their ability to buy these needed imports. But this advantage can be offset

³ *Policy Considerations Pertaining to Public Law 480*, available upon request from the Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

⁴ *Accumulation and Administration of Local Currencies*, available upon request from the Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

⁵ *The Report of the Committee on World Economic Practices*, available upon request from the Business Advisory Council, Department of Commerce, Washington 25, D.C.

if their agriculture declines and a situation of dependence on foreign food is created which they cannot hope to pay for in the foreseeable future. This could in time result in a serious problem for them as well as for us and for the free world.

When a Department of State officer was discussing this general problem the other day before another committee,⁶ he correctly pointed out the recipient countries themselves may find that other parts of our program displace their exports and reduce their export earnings. He said:

A good example of this type of problem was brought out by a statement made by the delegate from Pakistan to the GATT meeting in November 1958. He said that his country had greatly benefited from the United States surpluses and he thanked the United States Government. But he pointed out that the disposal by the United States of cotton surpluses had resulted in lower foreign exchange earnings from Pakistan's cotton exports, and he went on to express his fear that the situation was getting worse, observing that in the first quarter of 1958, as compared with the first quarter of 1957, Pakistan's foreign exchange earnings from cotton had dropped nearly 50 percent.

. . . It certainly would not make sense to the American taxpayer for us to tear down with one hand what we are trying to build with the other. This point was made recently by a representative of a country which has received substantial dollar aid from the United States. He said that his Government greatly appreciated this assistance but could not understand why the United States was, at the same time, displacing his country's normal marketings by sales of P.L. 480 tobacco.

It is of course difficult to mark the precise line where our agricultural disposal program would do more harm than good. Consumption varies from year to year, especially in a commodity like cotton, where so much depends on whether the textile industry is in a recession or a boom period. Disasters due to natural causes may temporarily reduce crops, and conversely a good crop year can create a burdensome surplus disruptive of market stability. The ability of importing countries to pay for their food imports is another variable.

Psychological attitudes also vary and determine, for example, whether buyers accumulate stocks or cease buying in the hope that lower prices will prevail later. At times, market stability and the attitudes of other exporting nations are governed not so much by what we actually do in administering our disposal program but what they fear we

⁶ For a statement by W. T. M. Beale before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on July 7, see Department of State press release 489 dated July 7.

might do. Because we are such a large producer of agricultural products and because our stocks are so large, we have, in the eyes of the entire free world, an obligation to act in a responsible way.

We have developed a procedure for dealing with this problem which works remarkably well considering all the variable and sometimes complex factors involved in each and every transaction. This procedure was recently explained in these words:⁶

After a request for P.L. 480 commodities is received—let us take a hypothetical example of country A, which has asked for 900,000 tons of wheat—we analyze the historical trade patterns for a past representative period. We evaluate the information concerning such factors as existing stocks, domestic production, estimated consumption, foreign exchange resources, and total import requirements. On the basis of the results we can determine approximately how much wheat we can put into country A without impairing normal commercial imports from the United States and other suppliers. Let us assume, for instance, that 600,000 tons turns out to be a reasonable amount to offer under title I. We then consult the other suppliers and explain what we have in mind. We point out that available data show that country A should be required to import 300,000 tons of wheat on a regular commercial competitive basis, that we believe this leaves room for them as well as ourselves to maintain our respective normal commercial exports to country A, and that we would like to have their views. If we have done our job well and our estimates are reasonable and realistic, the other suppliers will agree with us and express their sincere appreciation for taking their interests into account.

IV.

The considerations which argue against the displacement of commercial sales by title I transactions apply with particular force to barter. There are a number of reasons why we do not, in general, consider barter to be a very desirable way of disposing of large amounts of agricultural surplus:

First, we believe that all of our surplus which the world can consume, without disrupting normal trade channels, could be disposed of by commercial sales supplemented by the sale and grant techniques authorized in P.L. 480.

Second, often materials acquired in barter transactions cannot otherwise find a market in the United States either because of our import quotas, or because of restrictions imposed by international agreements, or because of a lack of demand here. The foreign seller therefore sometimes finds it convenient to make materials available for stockpiling at a reduced price. This makes it possible

for the United States entity to offer surplus agricultural products at a reduced price; and this, in turn, tends to lower world market prices.

Third, because a large proportion of our barter transactions has involved moving our surplus agricultural commodities to economically developed nations capable of paying dollars for their import requirements, our barter transactions are especially damaging to normal commercial trade. In this connection it is noted that the private character of the transactions and the lag in the availability of trade statistics make it especially difficult to prevent these barter transactions from displacing normal sales.

Fourth, we believe there is questionable value in the accumulation of additional amounts of commercially available materials for stockpile purposes when we already have quantities of the materials in excess of our military requirements and when there is no foreseeable prospect of being able to dispose of them in world markets without disruptive consequences. Large accumulations can constitute a burdensome surplus working for a lack of confidence in market stability.

Fifth, the displacement of dollar sales by barter transactions is of particular importance to us at this time. In 1958 the United States suffered a balance-of-payments deficit of about \$3.4 billion. The seasonably adjusted figure for the first quarter of 1959 was at an annual rate of \$3.7 billion. Each dollar earned from commercial exports of agricultural surplus tends to reduce the degree of deficit.

In the fiscal year just ended barter contracts to exchange agricultural products totaling \$156 million in export market value were entered into under the barter program. The national interest would, in our opinion, be best served by maintaining and strengthening the provisions in barter legislation regarding the undue disruption of world prices and replacement of commercial sales. We would consider it especially undesirable to require the barter of a fixed quantity of materials irrespective of world market conditions.

In conclusion I wish to repeat what I said in the beginning. P.L. 480 has, on balance, made a constructive contribution to our foreign policy as well as our national objectives. It can continue to do so if we continue to administer it in such a way as to serve our broad interests and those of the free world.

Department of State Supports Refugee Legislation

Statement by John W. Hanes, Jr.¹

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: It is always a particularly pleasant task to appear before this committee, all the members of which have always taken so close and personal an interest in the matters with which we in the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs deal. This morning I am here to present the views of the Department of State on the proposed legislation contained in H.J. Res. 397, "To enable the United States to participate in the resettlement of certain refugees."

I would like to start off by saying that the Department of State believes that the enactment of some refugee legislation during this session of Congress is tremendously important. Accordingly, we are particularly pleased that this committee seems equally interested in considering the legislation now before it.

We believe that H.J. Res. 397 is a good bill that would go far to meet the requirement for refugee legislation at this time. We do have, however, certain suggestions which we think would make it an even better bill. I would like to discuss these suggestions with you and to explain our reasons for advancing them.

At this time I should like to emphasize the continuing conviction of the Department of State that it is both consistent with and essential to our foreign policy that the United States continue to play a constructive and leading role in the matter of achieving solutions to refugee problems throughout the world. I know the committee is fully familiar with all the reasons why this is important—political reasons, economic reasons, humanitarian, indeed reasons in almost all fields which are vital to us today.

This year we have a particular desire to maintain the leading role we have so effectively held in the past. Just 2 weeks ago, the World Refugee Year officially began.² This international Year is the result of a resolution passed by the United

¹ Made before the Immigration and Nationality Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee on July 15 (press release 517). Mr. Hanes is Administrator of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs.

² For background, see BULLETIN of June 15, 1959, p. 872.

Nations last December,³ a resolution cosponsored and strongly supported by the United States (and, incidentally, which was opposed in the United Nations only by the Soviet Union and its satellites). The purpose of this international Year is not anything so unrealistic as trying to solve the world's refugee problem in 1 year. Any such attempt would be futile both in terms of resources available and of the nature of the problems involved, many of which are political and cannot be solved merely by spending money or by migration. Worse than this, however, any such attempt would be dangerously misleading for it would foster the illusion that the refugee problem is a static problem which can be solved in a certain number of months by a measurable amount of effort. The truth is, of course, that refugees pose an ever-changing problem which is never predictable from one year to the next and which will undoubtedly continue to exist as long as political and economic conditions exist in the world which create them.

The purpose of the World Refugee Year is to focus the attention of the nations and the people of the world on the true nature of this refugee problem. We particularly hope that it will create an interest in countries and among groups of people which have not previously known about or been interested in the problems of refugees. We hope that the Year will indeed result in some additional contributions to the solutions of refugee problems from countries or from people who have not previously helped or have not helped as much as they could. These contributions may be in terms of money or they may be in other equally useful ways, such as the acceptance by countries of additional refugees for resettlement, or perhaps the admission of additional categories of refugees, such as the very old or the crippled or the ill.

This resolution which you are considering today could be instrumental in maintaining U.S. leadership in this latter way of helping and in pointing the way to other countries. It provides for the admission to the United States of an unspecified number of refugees, under the terms of section 212(d)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of State and under parole by the Attorney General. The Department has supported an administration

bill which is substantially similar. There are, however, two important differences.

The administration bill sets 10,000 as the number of nonquotas refugees to be admitted annually except in case of an emergency situation. The Department believes this fixed figure for admissions is preferable to the provision for an unspecified number.

In the first place, we believe that under existing and predictable conditions this number constitutes a fair and reasonable contribution to the present problem. There are now roughly 40,000 refugees in Western Europe for whom resettlement is the most desirable solution; and there are a few groups among the refugees in the Near and Far East for whom, on a highly selective basis, resettlement in other countries including the United States is feasible.

A fixed ceiling also has other advantages.

A majority of refugees who desire resettlement want to come to the United States. Clearly this is not a solution. And yet, so long as there is a belief among refugee groups that there is no ceiling to immigration here and that they will be able to come to the United States, it is more difficult to persuade them to resettle in other countries. We believe that the existence of a realistic annual ceiling would help alleviate this problem.

Having an annual target figure also has administrative merit. It provides greater opportunity to assure uniform standards in selecting the applicants and to develop a sounder organization to handle the processing of the work.

Finally, a fixed number permits more effective relations between the Department and the public groups in this country interested in refugees. The degree to which a reasonable balance of admissions can be maintained between certain ethnic and nationality groups as well as on a geographic basis is materially lessened if no fixed limitations exist.

The Department is also concerned with the restricted definition of refugees eligible for admission which actually limits eligibility to those who fall under the mandate of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. In the opinion of the Department this restriction would discriminate against certain classes of refugees, principally in the Middle East and Far East, who do not fall under this mandate.

The Department believes, on grounds of foreign relations, of equity, and of benefit to the United

³ U.N. doc. A/RES/1285 (XIII).

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States, that recognition should be given the need for admitting a suitable number of the refugees presently located in both these areas. The comparatively small number of such persons admitted under P.L. 85-316 represent some of the most needy and persecuted cases. Equally important, they represent an extremely high level of needed professional and skilled backgrounds. They have also included many persons possessing the highest level of education of all refugees applying for admission.

Therefore, Mr. Chairman, in light of these explanations, the Department would recommend the following amendments in H. J. Res. 397: 1) that a maximum of 10,000 refugees be admitted annually with additional provisions to provide for emergency situations; and 2) amendment of the definition of a refugee to include "any alien (A) who because of persecution or fear of persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinion has fled or shall flee from any Communist, Communist-dominated, or Communist-occupied area, or from any country within the general area of the Middle East, and who cannot return to such area or country on account of race, religion, or political opinion, or (B) who is out of his usual place of abode because of a natural calamity, military operations, or political upheaval, and who is unable or unwilling to return to his usual place of abode, and (C) who is in a country or area which is neither Communist nor Communist-dominated, and (D) who has not been firmly resettled and is in urgent need of assistance for the essentials of life."

Mr. Chairman, we hope these ideas and this legislation will receive favorable consideration. Several thousand applications are presently on hand which would be processed immediately subsequent to enactment of new legislation.

Facts on Mutual Security Program In Viet-Nam To Be Given Congress

Press release 540 dated July 23

The Department of State, including the International Cooperation Administration, has welcomed the decision of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to schedule hearings in regard to the operation of the mutual security program in Viet-Nam. In order to enable the committee to obtain a full

and accurate picture of the program, the Department on July 22 asked the American Ambassador to Viet-Nam, Elbridge Durbrow, and the director of the U.S. Operations Mission at Saigon, Arthur Z. Gardiner, to return to Washington.

Ambassador Durbrow and Mr. Gardiner are expected to arrive from Saigon in time for hearings scheduled for July 30. Before returning to Saigon they will also appear before the Subcommittee on the Far East of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, which has also expressed a desire to obtain full information in regard to the mutual security program in Viet-Nam.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

86th Congress, 1st Session

Agreements for Cooperation for Mutual Defense Purposes. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Agreements for Cooperation of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on the exchange of military information and material with the United Kingdom, France, Canada, the Netherlands, Turkey, Greece, and the Federal Republic of Germany. June 11, 12, 17, July 1 and 2, 1959. 183 pp.

Inter-American Development Bank. Hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on S. 1928, a bill to provide for the participation of the United States in the Inter-American Development Bank. June 23, 1959. 59 pp.

Departments of State and Justice, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriation Bill, 1960. Conference report to accompany H.R. 7343. H. Rept. 620. June 30, 1959. 7 pp.

Authorizing Service by Canadian Vessels for Certain Alaska Ports. Report to accompany S. 175. H. Rept. 629. July 1, 1959. 4 pp.

Captive Nations Week. Report to accompany S. J. Res. 111. S. Rept. 467. July 2, 1959. 2 pp.

Amending the Act of May 26, 1949, as Amended, To Strengthen and Improve the Organization of the Department of State. Report to accompany S. 1877. H. Rept. 634. July 7, 1959. 4 pp.

Suspension on Duties on Metal Scrap. Report to accompany H.R. 6054. S. Rept. 482. July 8, 1959. 5 pp.

Inter-American Development Bank Act. Report to accompany S. 1928. S. Rept. 487. July 8, 1959. 7 pp.

Proposed Amendment to Agreement for Cooperation With the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Proposed Agreements for Cooperation With the Republic of France, Canada, Turkey, the Netherlands, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Greece on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes. Report pursuant to proposed agreements for cooperation on the uses of atomic energy for mutual defense purposes. S. Rept. 513, July 14, 1959, and H. Rept. 672, July 15, 1959. 57 pp. each.

International Wheat Agreement, 1959. Report to accompany Ex. E. 86th Cong., 1st sess. Ex. Rept. 5. July 14, 1959. 12 pp.

Extension of Public Law 480. Report to accompany S. 1748. S. Rept. 522. July 15, 1959. 9 pp.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Provisional Agenda of the Fourteenth Regular Session of the U.N. General Assembly¹

U.N. doc. A/4150 dated July 17

1. Opening of the session by the Chairman of the delegation of Lebanon.
2. Minute of silent prayer or meditation.
3. Credentials of representatives to the fourteenth session of the General Assembly:
 - (a) Appointment of the Credentials Committee;
 - (b) Report of the Credentials Committee.
4. Election of the President.
5. Constitution of the Main Committees and election of officers.
6. Election of Vice-Presidents.
7. Notification by the Secretary-General under Article 12, paragraph 2, of the Charter.
8. Adoption of the agenda.
9. Opening of the general debate.
10. Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization.
11. Report of the Security Council.
12. Report of the Economic and Social Council.
13. Report of the Trusteeship Council.
14. Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
15. Election of three non-permanent members of the Security Council.
16. Election of six members of the Economic and Social Council.
17. Election of two members of the Trusteeship Council.²
18. Election of a member of the International Court of Justice to fill the vacancy caused by the death of Judge José Gustavo Guerrero [letter dated 26 November 1958 from the President of the Security Council to the President of the General Assembly (A/4011)].
19. Question of amending the United Nations Charter, in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 108 of the Charter, to increase the number of non-permanent members of the Security Council and the number of votes required for decisions of the Council [resolution 1299 (XIII) of 10 December 1958].

¹ To convene at Headquarters, New York, on Sept. 15, 1959.

² Procedure to be devised in order to comply with the provisions of Article 86 of the Charter as France and Italy will cease to be Administering Authorities in 1960, the former on 27 April and the latter on 2 December 1960. [Footnote in original.]

20. Question of amending the United Nations Charter, in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 108 of the Charter, to increase the membership of the Economic and Social Council [resolutions 1299 (XIII) and 1300 (XIII) of 10 December 1958].
21. Question of amending the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 108 of the Charter of the United Nations and Article 69 of the Statute of the Court, with respect to an increase in the number of judges of the International Court of Justice [resolution 1299 (XIII) of 10 December 1958].
22. Report of the Committee on arrangements for a conference for the purpose of reviewing the Charter [resolution 1136 (XII) of 14 October 1957].
23. Interim report of the Secretary-General evaluating the Second United Nations International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy in relation to the holding of similar conferences in the future [resolution 1344 (XIII) of 13 December 1958].
24. Progress report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation [resolution 1347 (XIII) of 13 December 1958].
25. Report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space [resolution 1348 (XIII) of 13 December 1958].
26. The Korean question: report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea [resolution 1264 (XIII) of 14 November 1958].
27. United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East:
 - (a) Report of the Director of the Agency [resolution 1315 (XIII) of 12 December 1958];
 - (b) Proposals for the continuation of United Nations assistance to Palestine refugees: document submitted by the Secretary-General.
28. United Nations Emergency Force:
 - (a) Cost estimates for the maintenance of the Force;
 - (b) Manner of financing the Force: report of the Secretary-General on consultations with the Government of Member States [resolution 1337 (XIII) of 13 December 1958];
 - (c) Progress report on the Force.
29. Progress and operations of the Special Fund [resolution 1240 (XIII) of 14 October 1958, part B, para. 10].

30. Economic development of under-developed countries:

- (a) Report by the Secretary-General on measures taken by the Governments of Member States to further the economic development of under-developed countries in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1316 (XIII) [resolution 1316 (XIII) of 12 December 1958];
- (b) Progress in the field of financing the economic development of under-developed countries [resolution 1317 (XIII) of 12 December 1958].

31. Programmes of technical assistance:

- (a) Report of the Economic and Social Council;
- (b) United Nations assistance in public administration: report of the Secretary-General [resolution 1256 (XIII) of 14 November 1958];
- (c) Confirmation of the allocation of funds under the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance [resolution 831 (IX) of 26 November 1954].

32. United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency: progress report of the Administrator for Residual Affairs of the Agency [resolution 1304 (XIII) of 10 December 1958].

33. Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

34. Draft International Covenants on Human Rights [decision of the General Assembly on 12 December 1958].

35. Draft Convention on Freedom of Information: text of the draft Convention formulated by the Committee on the Draft Convention on Freedom of Information and report of the Secretary-General on the Comments of Governments thereon [resolution 1313 C (XIII) of 12 December 1958].

36. Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories transmitted under Article 73 e of the Charter: reports of the Secretary-General and of the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories:

- (a) Progress achieved by the Non-Self-Governing Territories in pursuance of Chapter XI of the Charter [resolution 1053 (XI) of 20 February 1957];
- (b) Information on educational conditions;
- (c) Information on other conditions;
- (d) General questions relating to the transmission and examination of information;
- (e) Report of the Secretary-General on new developments connected with the association of Non-Self-Governing Territories with the European Economic Community [resolution 1330 (XIII) of 12 December 1958];
- (f) Offers of study and training facilities under resolution 845 (IX) of 22 November 1954: report of the Secretary-General [resolution 1331 (XIII) of 12 December 1958].

37. Election to fill vacancies in the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories.

38. Question of South West Africa:

- (a) Report of the Good Offices Committee on South West Africa [resolution 1243 (XIII) of 30 October 1958];
- (b) Report of the Committee on South West Africa [resolution 749 A (VIII) of 28 November 1953];
- (c) Study of legal action to ensure the fulfilment of the obligations assumed by the Union of South Africa in respect of the Territory of South West Africa [resolution 1247 (XIII) of 30 October 1958];
- (d) Election of three members of the Committee on South West Africa [resolution 1061 (XI) of 26 February 1957].

39. Offers by Member States of study and training facilities for inhabitants of Trust Territories: report of the Trusteeship Council [resolution 1277 (XIII) of 5 December 1958].

40. Question of the frontier between the Trust Territory of Somaliland under Italian administration and Ethiopia: reports of the Governments of Ethiopia and of Italy [resolution 1345 (XIII) of 13 December 1958].

41. The future of the Trust Territory of the Cameroons under United Kingdom administration [resolution 1350 (XIII) of 13 March 1959].

- (a) Organization of the plebiscite in the southern part of the Territory: question of the two alternatives to be put to the people and the qualifications for voting;
- (b) Report of the United Nations Plebiscite Commissioner on the plebiscite in the northern part of the Territory and report of the Trusteeship Council.

42. Financial reports and accounts, and reports of the Board of Auditors:

- (a) United Nations (for the financial year ended 31 December 1958);
- (b) United Nations Children's Fund (for the financial year ended 31 December 1958);
- (c) United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (for the financial year ended 31 December 1958);
- (d) United Nations Refugee Fund (for the financial year ended 31 December 1958).

43. Supplementary estimates for the financial year 1959.

44. Budget estimates for the financial year 1960.

45. Appointments to fill vacancies in the membership of subsidiary bodies of the General Assembly:

- (a) Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions;
- (b) Committee on Contributions;
- (c) Board of Auditors;
- (d) Investments Committee: confirmation of the appointment made by the Secretary-General;
- (e) United Nations Administrative Tribunal;
- (f) United Nations Staff Pension Committee.

46. Report of the Negotiating Committee for Extra-Budgetary Funds [resolution 1296 B (XIII) of 5 December 1958].

47. Scale of assessments for the apportionment of the expenses of the United Nations: report of the Committee

on Contributions [see resolution 1308 B (XIII) of 10 December 1958].

48. Audit reports relating to expenditure by specialized agencies of technical assistance funds allocated from the Special Account [resolution 519 A (VI) of 12 January 1952].
49. Administrative and budgetary co-ordination between the United Nations and the specialized agencies: report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions.
50. Construction of the United Nations building in Santiago, Chile: progress report of the Secretary-General [resolution 1273 (XIII) of 14 November 1958].
51. United Nations International School: report of the Secretary-General [resolution 1297 (XIII) of 5 December 1958].
52. Public information activities of the United Nations: report of the Secretary-General [resolution 1335 (XIII) of 13 December 1958].
53. United Nations Joint Staff Pension Fund:
 - (a) Annual report on the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Fund;
 - (b) Report on the fifth actuarial valuation of the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Fund.
54. Personnel questions:
 - (a) Geographical distribution of the staff of the Secretariat: report of the Secretary-General [resolution 1294 (XIII) of 5 December 1958];
 - (b) Proportion of fixed-term staff;
 - (c) Other personnel questions.
55. Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its eleventh session.
56. Diplomatic intercourse and immunities [resolution 1288 (XIII) of 5 December 1958].
57. Question of the publication of a United Nations juridical yearbook [resolution 1291 (XIII) of 5 December 1958].
58. Question of initiating a study of the juridical régime of historic waters, including historic bays [resolution 1306 (XIII) of 10 December 1958].
59. Prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons [item proposed by Ireland].
60. Question of the representation of China in the United Nations [item proposed by India].
61. Question of Algeria [item proposed by Afghanistan, Burma, Ceylon, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, United Arab Republic and Yemen].
62. Treatment of people of Indian origin in the Union of South Africa [item proposed by India and Pakistan]:
 - (a) Explanatory memorandum by the Government of India;
 - (b) Explanatory memorandum by the Government of Pakistan.
63. Question of race conflict in South Africa resulting from the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of the Union of South Africa [item proposed by Ceylon,

Cuba, Federation of Malaya, Ghana, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, United Arab Republic, Uruguay and Venezuela].

Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography¹

Security Council

Letter Dated 10 July 1959 From the Representatives of Afghanistan, Burma, Ceylon, Federation of Malaya, Ghana, Guinea, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, United Arab Republic and Yemen Addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/4195. July 10, 1959. 3 pp.

Letter Dated 13 July 1959 From the Representative of France Addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/4197. July 14, 1959. 1 p.

General Assembly

Proposed Allocations for UNHCR Programmes for 1960 Related to the Needs of Non-Settled Refugees (Submitted by the High Commissioner). A/AC.96/26. May 15, 1959. 22 pp.

Progress Achieved by the Non-Self-Governing Territories in Pursuance of Chapter XI of the Charter: Health Services and Activities in the Non-Self-Governing Territories. Report prepared by the World Health Organization. A/4128. June 23, 1959. 113 pp.

Administrative and Budgetary Co-ordination Between the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Second report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions to the General Assembly at its fourteenth session. A/4135. July 8, 1959. 29 pp.

Progress Achieved by the Non-Self-Governing Territories in Pursuance of Chapter XI of the Charter: Nutrition in the Non-Self-Governing Territories. Report prepared by the World Health Organization and the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization. A/4136. July 9, 1959. 23 pp.

Provisional Agenda of the Fourteenth Regular Session of the General Assembly: Item Proposed by India. Question of the Representation of China in the United Nations. Letter dated 13 July 1959 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations, addressed to the Secretary-General. A/4139. July 14, 1959. 2 pp.

Provisional Agenda of the Fourteenth Regular Session of the General Assembly: Item Proposed by Afghanistan, Burma, Ceylon, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, United Arab Republic and Yemen. The Question of Algeria. A/4140. July 14, 1959. 2 pp.

Report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. A/4141. July 14, 1959. 76 pp.

Progress Achieved by the Non-Self-Governing Territories in Pursuance of Chapter XI of the Charter: Cultural and Scientific Institutions in Non-Self-Governing Territories. Report prepared by the United Nations Educa-

¹ Printed materials may be secured in the United States from the International Documents Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N.Y. Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United States.

tional, Scientific and Cultural Organization. A/4144. July 14, 1959. 34 pp.
Administrative and Budgetary Co-Ordination Between the United Nations and the International Telecommunication Union. Eighth report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions to the General Assembly at its fourteenth session. A/4148. July 17, 1959. 19 pp.

Trusteeship Council

United Nations Visiting Mission to the Trust Territories of Nauru, New Guinea and the Pacific Islands, 1959: Report of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. T/1447. May 8, 1959. 121 pp.

United Nations Visiting Mission to the Trust Territories of Nauru, New Guinea and the Pacific Islands, 1959: Report on the Trust Territory of New Guinea. T/1451. June 8, 1959. 89 pp.

Offers by Member States of the United Nations of Study and Training Facilities for Inhabitants of Trust Territories. Report of the Secretary-General. T/1462. June 9, 1959. 14 pp.

Dissemination of Information on the United Nations and the International Trusteeship System in the Trust Territories. Report of the Secretary-General. T/1463. June 9, 1959. 11 pp.

Examination of the Annual Report on the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands for the Year Ended 30 June 1958. Observations of the World Health Organization. T/1470. June 26, 1959. 5 pp.

Examination of the Annual Report on the Trust Territory of New Guinea for the Year Ended 30 June 1958. Observations of the World Health Organization. T/1472. July 3, 1959. 7 pp.

Examination of the Annual Report on the Trust Territory of Somaliland Under Italian Administration. Observations of the World Health Organization. T/1475. July 16, 1959. 5 pp.

Examination of the Annual Report on the Trust Territory of Somaliland Under Italian Administration. Supplementary information submitted by the Administering Authority. T/1476. July 16, 1959. 42 pp.

Examination of the Annual Report on the Trust Territory of Somaliland Under Italian Administration. Letter dated 16 July 1959 from the Permanent Representative of Italy to the United Nations, addressed to the Secretary-General. T/1477. July 17, 1959. 14 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

United States and Austria Sign New Atoms-for-Peace Agreement

The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of State announced on July 22 (press release 537) that representatives of the Governments of the Republic of Austria and the United States on that day had signed at Washington, D.C., a new agreement for cooperation concerning the civil uses of atomic energy, superseding the

current accord dated June 8, 1956.¹ Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Ivan B. White and Acting Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission Harold S. Vance signed for the United States, and Ambassador Wilfried Platzer for the Republic of Austria.

The new agreement raises from 6 to 50 kilograms the total amount of uranium 235 contained in fuel which may be transferred to Austria; provides that research and materials-testing reactors operating with core loadings of up to 8 kilograms of fuel may be supplied with uranium enriched up to 90 percent; liberalizes the transfer of research quantities of special nuclear materials; and in general expands the areas of cooperation and assistance in line with more recently negotiated agreements for cooperation.

In addition the United States and Austria have affirmed in this agreement their common interest in the International Atomic Energy Agency and to this end have agreed to consult with each other, upon the request of either party, to determine in what respects the agreement might subsequently be modified.

The new agreement, which runs for 10 years, will come into force with an exchange of notes following the completion of the statutory requirements of both countries.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Cultural Property

Convention for the protection of cultural property in the event of armed conflict and regulations of execution; Protocol for the protection of cultural property in the event of armed conflict.

Done at The Hague May 14, 1954. Entered into force

August 7, 1956.²

Ratification deposited: Iran, June 22, 1959.

BILATERAL

Austria

Agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington July 22, 1959. Enters into force on the date each Government receives from the other written notification that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements.

¹ Treaties and Other International Acts Series 3800.

² Not in force for the United States.

Belgium

Agreement amending the agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy of June 15, 1955, as amended (TIAS 3301 and 3738). Signed at Washington July 22, 1959. Enters into force on the date each Government receives from the other written notification that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements.

Burma

Agreement granting special economic assistance to Burma for construction purposes. Effectuated by exchange of notes at Rangoon June 24, 1959. Entered into force June 24, 1959.

Canada

Agreement relating to the establishment of a ballistic missile early-warning system. Effectuated by exchange of notes at Ottawa July 13, 1959. Entered into force July 13, 1959.

China

Agreement relating to the loan of small craft by the United States to China. Effectuated by exchange of notes at Taipei July 8, 1959. Entered into force July 8, 1959.

Ecuador

Agreement amending the agreement of June 27, 1958 (TIAS 4052), providing financial assistance to Ecuador. Effectuated by exchange of notes at Washington July 17, 1959. Entered into force July 17, 1959.

France

Agreement for cooperation on uses of atomic energy for mutual defense purposes. Signed at Washington May 7, 1959.

Entered into force: July 20, 1959 (date each party received from the other written notification that it has complied with statutory and constitutional requirements).

Agreement amending the agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy of June 19, 1956, as amended (TIAS 3689 and 3883). Signed at Washington July 22, 1959. Enters into force on the date each Government receives from the other written notification that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements.

Germany

Agreement amending the agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy of July 3, 1957 (TIAS 3877). Signed at Washington July 22, 1959. Enters into force on the date each Government receives from the other written notification that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements.

Italy

Agreement amending the agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy of July 3, 1957 (TIAS 4016). Signed at Washington July 22, 1959. Enters into force on the date each Government receives from the other written notification that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements.

Netherlands

Agreement amending the agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy of June 22, 1956, as amended (TIAS 3876). Signed at Washington July 22, 1959. Enters into force on the date each Government receives from the other written notification that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements.

Thailand

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of March 4, 1957 (TIAS 3777). Effectuated by ex-

change of notes at Bangkok March 12 and April 9, 1959. Entered into force April 9, 1959.

United Kingdom

Agreement amending the agreement for cooperation on uses of atomic energy for mutual defense purposes of July 3, 1958 (TIAS 4078). Signed at Washington May 7, 1959.

Entered into force: July 20, 1959 (date each party received from the other written notification that it has complied with statutory and constitutional requirements).

Yugoslavia

Agreement supplementing the agricultural commodities agreement of December 22, 1958 (TIAS 4153). Signed at Belgrade July 9, 1959. Entered into force July 9, 1959.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Designations

Daniel V. Anderson as director, Office of Southeast Asian Affairs, effective July 20.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: July 20-26

Press releases may be obtained from the News Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Releases issued prior to July 20 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 515 of July 14, 517, 519, and 520 of July 15, 522 of July 16, and 525 of July 17.

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530	7/20	Spanish economic stabilization program.
531	7/20	Dominican Republic credentials (rewrite).
532	7/21	Sudan credentials (rewrite).
533	7/21	Dulles papers for Eisenhower library (rewrite).
534	7/21	Hale sworn in as member, Permanent Commission on Conciliation (biographic details).
535	7/21	Agreement with U.S.S.R. for exchanges of scientists (rewrite).
*536	7/21	Training of exchange teachers for overseas assignments.
537	7/22	Atoms-for-peace agreement with Austria.
538	7/23	Brazil credentials (rewrite).
539	7/23	Ambassador and ICA director to give facts on Viet-Nam program.
*540	7/23	DLF loan in Lebanon (rewrite).
541	7/24	Herter: arrival at Berlin.
542	7/24	Attack on plane over Sea of Japan.
543	7/25	Herter: dedication of John Foster Dulles Allee.
544	7/25	Medical group to visit Asia on cholera research project.

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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